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I Introduction
The interpretation of a statute is not an event. It is a process. It begins
with the text, though the reader brings much to this beginning, requires an
immersion in context, inevitably circles back to history and the legislative
record whether we want it to or not, and then proceeds to the consideration of
ever-expanding layers of judicial interpretation and application. It involves
contemplation, common sense, an awareness of related legal principles, a
willingness to reconsider, to begin anew, and, at its very best, a good faith
fidelity to the words of the text. At some point the text takes on a life of its
own, its individual words becoming nothing more than the skeleton over which
a skin of perceived understandings and assumptions loosely drapes. At times,
the duty of the textual interpreter, like a forensic pathologist, is to return to that
skeleton.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")
extensively revised the law of habeas corpus as practiced within the federal
judicial system. One of those revisions applied to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which
limits a federal court's authority to grant writs of habeas corpus on behalf of
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persons in state custody. Consistent with this section, a federal court's
jurisdictional authority is constrained by three specified standards of review,
two pertaining to errors of law and one pertaining to errors of fact. This Article
focuses on subsection (d)(1), which creates the critical review standards
applicable to errors of law.
A mere seventy-six words in length, subsection (d)(1) is enormously
important because it performs a gatekeeper function for federal habeas review
of state courtjudgments. It controls all "error of law" access to federal habeas
review. As a practical matter, the operational scope of subsection (d)(1)
depends on the interpretation of its two key textual components. The first
limits the grant of federal habeas to state court decisions that contravene
"clearly'established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." Careful
attention to these words is required to appreciate the nature and scope of the
claims that may be asserted on habeas. The second component creates two
alternative standards of review, one pertaining to state court decisions that are
"contrary to" clearly established federal law, and the other pertaining to state
court decisions that "involve an unreasonable application of" that law. While
neither of these phrases seems mysterious or elusive in isolation, we will see
that some effort is required to understand how each phrase operates in the
context of federal habeas review. Part II of this Article examines the text of
subsection (d)(1) with an eye toward discovering a sensible and contextual
interpretation of its words. In so doing, my goal is not to create a liberal or a
conservative reading of the text, but to read that text in a manner that respects
the words as they operate within the relatively sophisticated realm of the law.
Since AEDPA was adopted in 1996, and prior to the October 2002 Term,
the Supreme Court decided only seven cases citing subsection (d)(1).' Most of
those cases provide little or no interpretive insight. The critical baseline
interpretation of subsection (d)(1) appears in Williams v. Taylor,/ decided in
June of 2000. In addition, we can glean some further insight from a few other
cases decided prior to the October 2002 term of the Court. Part III of this
Article examines Williams and the Court's other early interpretations and
applications of subsection (d)(1). We will see that while Williams and its
satellite cases answer some basic interpretive questions, they also leave other
very important questions unanswered, particularly those related to the scope of
I. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 689 (2002); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 660 (2002);
Penryv. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782,791 (2001); Ramdass v.Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 165 (2000);
(Michael Wayne) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 424 (2000); (Terrence) Williams v.Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000); Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 227 (2000).
2. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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the "unreasonable application" standard. Unfortunately, even this small pattern
of decisions is not entirely coherent.
That brings us to the October 2002 Term of the Court. In that term, the
Court decided six cases involving AEDPA. Four of those cases involved3
interpretations and applications of subsection (d)(1): Woodford v. Visciotti,
Early v. Packer,4 Lockyer v. Andrade,5 and Wiggins v. Smith.6 In each of its
majority opinions, the Court purported to apply some variation of the Williams
interpretation of subsection (d)(1). Part IV of this Article examines these most
recent decisions to see what they add to (or subtract from) the Court's initial
interpretations of subsection (d)(1). As a preview of my critical assessment,
three of those cases cohere to text and precedent in a reasonably illuminating
fashion, while the fourth coheres to nothing more than the narrow result
achieved in that case. We are left, therefore, with a mix of light and fog. The
goal of this Article is to attempt to discover a useful way of exposing the light
and penetrating the fog. The idea is to find a workable way of applying
§ 2254(d)(1) in a fashion that comports with text and precedent.
As I stated at the outset, statutory interpretation is a process. In Part V, I
suggest a method by which to continue that process with respect to subsection
(d)(1). The proposed method is somewhat counterintuitive. It posits that text
informs precedent and not the converse. I refer to this method as "text-first"
and will put my defense of it aside for the moment. The basic idea, however, is
that text ought to prevail over precedent unless the precedent unequivocally
alters a fair reading of the text. In short, we should presume that whenever the
Supreme Court (or any court) interprets a statutory text, its goal is to discover
and not alter the meaning that emanates from the text. Hence, the text will help
inform the meaning we derive from the interpretative precedent.
II. The Text of28 US.C. § 2254(d)(1)
The text of a statute should tell its own story without the intervention of a
judicial narrator. Hence, before discussing the "judicial law" of § 2254(d), I
begin with an examination of the statutory text in an effort to understand what
the words of the text convey when read in conjunction with one another and in
the overall context of the law of habeas corpus. I take as a starting point for
this examination Justice Scalia's observation: "A text should not be construed
3.
4.
5.
6.

Woodford v. Visciotti, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).
Early v. Packer, 123 S.Ct. 362 (2002).
Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2002).
Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (2003).
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strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed
reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means."7 The goal is not to discover
what the legislature intended, but what it said,' though as we will see the
legislative history does play some role in this quest.
To that end, § 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 9
Note that the limitations imposed by § 2254(d) are separated according to
the type of claim that is asserted. Subsection (d)(1) describes the standards
applicable to issues of law, including pure questions of law and mixed
questions of law and fact, while subsection (d)(2) provides the relevant
standards for claims challenging a state court's findings of fact. The focus of
this Article is on subsection (d)(1). Clearly, however, in either case, unless the
appropriate standard is satisfied, the text of § 2254(d) operates to divest an
Article 1H judge (hereafter "federal judge" or "federal court") of the power to
grant a writ of habeas corpus as to any claim that has been "adjudicated on the
merits" in a state court. I take the phrase "adjudicated on the merits" to mean
that the issue was presented to the state court and that the state court resolved
the claim without reference to state rules of procedural default.' 0 In short, once
a state court has decided the issue on nondefault grounds, a federal court may
not revisit that issue on habeas unless the standards of § 2254(d) have been
satisfied.

7.

ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23 (1997).

8.
9.

Id. at 16-18.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2001).

10. If a claim has not been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, § 2254(d) does not
apply. It is quite likely, however, that such a claim will either fall prey to the exhaustion
requirements of § 2254(b)-(c) or have been procedurally defaulted. As to the standards for
procedurally defaulted claims, see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,750 (1991)(explaining
the cause and prejudice standard for procedural defaults); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S.
333, 336-41 (1992) (explaining the "clear and convincing" innocent of the death penalty
standard); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (explaining the "probable" innocence of
the crime standard).
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A. The FirstComponent of Subsection (d)(1)
As noted, subsection (d)(1) pertains to claims raising issues of law, either
pure or mixed. There are two critical components to this provision. The first
(which actually comes second in the text) narrows the types of available claims
to those premised on "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States."
1. Clearly EstablishedFederalLaw
The noun phrase, "Federal law" seems susceptible to only one reasonable
interpretation, namely, as pertaining to the laws of the United States, including
constitutional law, statutes, regulations, federal common law, and treaties.
Such an interpretation would also be consistent with the scope of federal habeas
as provided in § 2241(b)(3), which states that the writ shall not extend to a
prisoner unless "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the Untied States." However, this law must be "clearly established."
Despite the potential elasticity of the word "clearly," pinpointing a workable
definition of that phrase is not particularly difficult.
The adjectival phrase, "clearly established," modifies the noun phrase
"Federal law." Stated generally, we can say that a law becomes established
when it is set forth in terms and under circumstances that are recognized as
enforceable; this is H.L.A. Hart's so-called "rule of recognition."" Thus,
legislation that passes both houses of Congress and is signed by the President
creates established law as of its effective date of enforcement. Similarly,
Supreme Court precedent construing and applying the Constitution creates
established law as of the date of the Court's decision.' 2 But the statute calls for
more than mere establishment. Within the adjectival phrase, the adverb
"clearly" modifies the adjective "established." This suggests that the status of
the law's establishment must be readily and perhaps unmistakably discernible.
In the context of a statute, adherence to constitutional procedure surely
meets this standard. In other words, a federal statute "clearly establishes" a
11. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961). In Hart's terminology, we might
say that a law is established when the law complies with the rule of recognition for the particular
jurisdiction. For federal statutes in the United States, the rule of recognition provides a
relatively bright-line test at the procedural level, i.e., the bicameralism and presentment rules
discussed in the text accompanying this note.
12. See Allan Ides, Judicial Supremacy and the Law of the Constitution, 47 UCLA L.
Rev. 491,491-92 (1999) (concluding that the Supreme Court creates constitutional law with its
decisions).
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federal right, unless the federal statute is enacted contrary to constitutional
procedure.13 An enactment that satisfies bicameralism and presentment is by
definition clearly established. With respect to Supreme Court precedent, one
would think that the majority view of the Court expressed within the holding
and rationale of a decided case represents the clearly established rule of law.
This formula is neither novel nor remarkable. It conforms neatly with the "rule
of recognition" that is generally applicable to Supreme Court precedent. In
short, the phrase "clearly established Federal law" connotes principles of law
emanating from the authority of the United States government that have been
adopted or pronounced through a recognized medium such as legislation,
rulemaking, or binding precedent.
2. As Determinedby the Supreme Court
The limiting phrase, "as determined by the Supreme Court," suggests that
these recognized principles of law must be embodied in a pre-existing Supreme
Court precedent. While this phrase could mean no more than that the Supreme
Court has the final authority to decide whether a question of federal law has
been clearly established, that is, a simple reiteration of the Court's position in
the judicial hierarchy, such an interpretation would render the language of the
statute superfluous. Moreover, the concept of"clearly established Federal law,"
which is to some extent borrowed from the law ofqualified immunity, connotes
a temporal element, that is, it suggests a pre-existing state of the law. In terms
of qualified immunity, for example, a clearly established principle is one that
has been established as of the date of the challenged activity. Given that usage,
it would seem that in the context of § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's
determination of what constitutes clearly established federal law must itself
predate the state court's judgment, that is, the law must have been established
as of the date of the challenged judgment. This interpretation is also consistent
with Teague v. Lane,14 where the Court held that in the context of pre-AEDPA
§ 2254 petitions, "new law," that is, law not established as of the date of the
challenged judgment, could not form the basis for habeas relief. While the text
itself does not reference Teague, any statutory construction must take into
account the background legal principles against which the statute was
adopted. 5 Teague clearly represents one of those background principles.
13. We might also say that a statutory principle is not clearly established if itviolates
some other constitutional limitation such as due process or equal protection.
14. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
15. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
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If the foregoing is correct, then it follows that the federal law at issue must
be embodied in a pre-existing Supreme Court precedent. This interpretation of
the statutory language also finds support in the simple fact that the only basis
that a lower federal court has for deciding whether a particular federal law is
clearly established "as determined by the Supreme Court" is by reference to
pre-existing Supreme Court precedent. 16 Logically then, it seems that the
phrase "as determined by the Supreme Court" translates into "as embodied
within Supreme Court precedent." That being the case, it follows that
consistent with § 2254(d)(1), lower court opinions not mandated by Supreme
Court precedent cannot serve as the basis for habeas relief. It also follows,
somewhat oddly, that a statute passed by Congress and signed by the President,
although clearly established under a rule of recognition, cannot serve as the
basis for habeas relief unless previously construed by the Supreme Court
unless, of course, that statute excepts itself from the scope of § 2254(d)(1).
This focus on Supreme Court precedent can be seen as a major revision of
the law of habeas. It effectively reins in circuit courts that may have a
proclivity to expand the rights of habeas petitioners and leaves the development
of the law in this context solely in the hands of the Supreme Court.
Experimentation by the lower courts is, in essence, forbidden.
B. The Second Component of Subsection (d)(1)
The second component of subsection (d)(1) permits a federal court to
grant habeas relief only "with respect to [a] claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings" and only if that adjudication "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of'
clearly established federal law. Note that it is the state court's "decision" that
must transgress the "contrary to" or "unreasonable application" provisions.
Moreover, that decision must be preceded by an adjudication on the merits. I
take the combination of these factors-adjudication on the merits and resulting
decision-to mean that the writ may be issued only if the outcome of the state
concurring) ("The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined ... on the basis
of which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage.. . , and (2) most
compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be
integrated

....").

16. Assuming this to be the accepted interpretation, one wonders whether clearly
established statutory or treaty rights "available" at the time of the state court judgment can
provide a basis for habeas if the Supreme Court has yet to interpret those provisions. Because
the answer is clearly "no" with respect to constitutional law, the answer here would seem to be
"no" as well unless the statute or treaty established an exception to § 2254(d)(1).
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court adjudication, that is, the decision premised on that adjudication, is itself
either contrary to, or the product of, an unreasonable application of federal law.
In short, the statute focuses our attention on the overall decision and not on
some subsidiary part of it.
As a preview, the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" standards
appear to be premised in part on the convenient distinction lawyers commonly
draw between pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. That
common usage may suggest something like a bright-line difference between
these two categories of potential legal error. Actual practice, however, reveals
that the distinction is often blurred and sometimes not discernible. We should
not expect, therefore, that review standards premised in part on the "distinction"
between pure and mixed questions of law will themselves create distinct
dichotomies. Some overlap is to be expected as a product of the overlapping
categories to which they are intended to apply.
1. ContraryTo
The word "contrary" denotes incompatibility or logical inconsistency.' 7
Two propositions are incompatible with one another if both cannot be true or
correct. Thus, a state court decision is contrary to federal law if that decision
and the applicable federal law cannot both be true or correct. Given this
premise, there appears to be four possible combinations of state court
adjudications and resulting decisions that are pertinent to this textual inquiry:
*

the state court applies the correct federal standard and arrives at a
correct outcome;

"

the state court applies an incorrect federal standard' 8 and arrives
at an incorrect outcome;

*

the state court applies an incorrect federal standard and arrives at
a correct outcome; and,

*

the state court applies the correct federal standard and arrives at
an incorrect outcome.

17. WEBSTER'S THIRD New INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 495 (1986).
18. 1take "incorrect federal standard" to include both a failure to recognize that there is an
applicable federal standard and an erroneous interpretation of an applicable federal standard. In
other words, the concept includes both a problem of recognition and a problem of interpretation.
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In each of these combinations, I am assuming that the decision is premised
on an agreed set of facts. The first two combinations provide easy solutions
within the context of subsection (d)(1). If a state court achieves a correct
outcome through application of the correct federal standard, then its decision
cannot in any fashion be described as contrary to federal law. Both the state
court decision and the federal law principle can be described as correct, that is,
they are not incompatible with one another. And, of course, we would not
expect a federal court to grant habeas under such circumstances. However, if
the state court arrives at an incorrect outcome through application of an
incorrect federal standard--our second combination, then its decision is
contrary to federal law. The state court decision and the federal standard are
plainly incompatible in the sense that both cannot be correct. Under such
circumstances, the grant of habeas is permitted by the text of subsection (d)(1).
This too is an expected conclusion.
The third combination-incorrect federal standard but correct outcomeis easily solved but requires a slightly more elaborate explanation. Although
the standard identified and described by the state court is incompatible with the
correct federal standard, the outcome of the case is not. Hence, even if the state
court appears to have misperceived the federal standard or the range of its
applicability, the decision itself is immune from federal habeas because the
state court's decision, that is, the outcome, is not itself contrary to federal law.
At most we have an example of harmless error. Moreover, and this is key, it is
not clear that the state court applied an incorrect standard because whatever
standard it applied led it to the correct result. In other words, the state court
may have taken what appeared to be the wrong road by misidentifying the
applicable standard, but it arrived at the right destination, suggesting that the
road may not have been all that wrong to begin with, perhaps just an
alternative, parallel path. At least from the perspective of the state court's
ultimate decision, both the "correct" and seemingly "incorrect" standards are for
all practical purposes identical because they generated the same result. As with
the first combination, with which this combination is virtually identical, we
would expect a federal court to deny habeas under such circumstances.
The fourth combination-correct federal standard but incorrect outcome-presents some minor interpretational challenges and a necessary shift in focus.
This combination presents what lawyers would commonly describe as a
misapplication of the law to the facts. Given that common usage, there are two
reasons why the contrary-to standard is ill-suited to this combination. First, if a
state court correctly identifies and accurately describes the correct federal
standard, then the "contrary to" language does not accurately capture the
relationship between the state court decision and the established principle of
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federal law. The state court decision is at least partially correct: it got the law
right. In this sense, the decision and the law are surely compatible with one
another. One could say that the incompatibility, if any, between that decision
and the law rests largely in the margins, a type of partial and perhaps even
minimal incompatibility. Of course, if the facts underlying the state court
decision verge on being materially identical to the facts underlying the binding
federal precedent, then that incompatibility would become more evident and
less marginal. But for the entire range of fact-specific application potentials,
"contrary to" seems at best a blunt way to describe what is in essence a
misapplication of the law.
Second, and perhaps more to the point, the text of subsection (d)(1)
provides a more suitable device for these purposes, namely, the "unreasonable
application" standard. Indeed, that standard seems textually designed for the
measure of problems arising within the fourth combination, namely,
applications of the law to the facts. Hence, a state court decision falling within
this combination cannot be said, as a general matter, to be contrary to federal
law.
In sum, a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme
Court precedent if and only if the state court identifies and applies a legal
standard other than the one dictated by that precedent and, as a consequence,
arrives at an outcome incompatible with that precedent. We could say that all
misapplications of federal law are contrary to federal law, but such a usage is at
the very least imprecise and, in any event, becomes unnecessary through the
presence of the unreasonable application clause.
2. Involved an UnreasonableApplication Of
Section 2254(d)(1) alternatively provides that a federal district court may
grant habeas if a state court's adjudication of a federal claim "resulted in a
decision that.., involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law. .. ." The use of the word "involved" is a bit perplexing. The
potential interpretations range from the fairly general "contained" or "included"
to the somewhat more specific "to have an effect on."' 9 The former may
suggest a loose relationship between the decision and the law being applied,
more in the sense ofjust "being there" rather than of having any consequence to
the decision. The "effect on" connotation, on the other hand, suggests a causal
relationship between the law's application and the decision. This latter

19.

WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1191

(1986).
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meaning seems the more likely. If we understand a judicial "decision" to be
composed of reasoning leading to an outcome, then to say that a decision
"involved" a particular application of the law is to suggest that the application
was intertwined with the outcome, that is, that it had an effect on the outcome
in the sense that the outcome was at least partly premised on that application.
Suppose, for example, that a habeas petition included a Miranda claim. If the
state court refused to entertain that claim based on procedural default, then we
would speak imprecisely to say that the court's decision involved a Miranda
claim. While the case surely involved Miranda, the decision itself involved
only a question of procedural default. I take "involve," therefore, to convey
something like "premised on." To conclude otherwise would be to permit
habeas when the law application at issue was of no consequence to the
decision. Such an unexpected and wholly peculiar interpretation is to be
avoided when plausible alternatives exist.
The noun "application" used in this context refers to the process through
which a court determines the legal consequences pertaining to a particular set of
facts, that is to say, application occurs when a court uses standards imposed by
law to determine the legal consequences that flow from a particular set of facts.
We are assuming, at least at the outset, that the court has applied the correct
standard in the sense that the standard has been correctly identified and
articulated. The question then is when can such a process be deemed to have
been "unreasonable."
There are many contexts in which the concept of unreasonableness is used
in the law. Two are relevant here. The first finds its most familiar articulation
in tort law. As is well established, only unreasonable conduct can serve to
establish a party's negligence. 20 The measure of this principle is the objective
reasonable person standard, which posits as its ideal a "prudent and careful
person, who is always up to the standard.' ' Furthermore, when the conduct at
issue is that of a professional person, this reasonableness standard embodies the
standards of the profession. "Professional persons in general, and those who
undertake any work calling for special skill, are required not only to exercise
reasonable care in what they do, but also to possess a standard minimum of
special knowledge and ability. 2 2 Here we are speaking of a reasonable jurist
standard. In the specific context of a judge applying the law to an agreed set of
facts, an unreasonable application is one that a prudent and careful jurist
20. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS 169-73 (5th ed.
1984); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 275 (2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 282, 283 (1965).
21. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 175; DOBBS supra note 20, at 277-80.
22.

KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at 185; DOBBS, supra note 20, at 290.
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applying professional standards of craft and competence would not have made.
In this sense, an unreasonable application of the law is an application that
reflects an exercise of judgment that falls below the minimal standards of
competence expected of ajudge. For example, an unreasonable application of
law might occur if the judge fails to apply an essential element of controlling
doctrine, undertakes an application that displays a material misunderstanding of
that doctrine, or fails to attend to all facts relevant under the terms of the
doctrine.
Courts sometimes use the concept of reasonableness synonymously with
rationality. This occurs when a government actor has the authority to choose
among a range of alternatives. Under this reasonableness/rationality test, a
court will uphold an actor's choice so long as the choice remains within the
permissible range of alternatives and can be deemed to have been a rational
choice among those alternatives. This type of deferential review is most often
used to measure the legitimacy of policy judgments made by legislatures or
administrative agencies.23 In the context of constitutional law, for example,
courts will deny a substantive due process challenge to economic legislation so
long as the legislative choice can be deemed rational.24 Judges too are
sometimes vested with the authority to choose among competing alternatives.
This occurs with what might be called judicial management decisions, for
example, whether to transfer a case to a different venue, but it might also occur
with decisions pertaining to substantive law. In other words, the substantive
law may give the judge a choice among competing alternatives. For example,
in criminal sentencing judges are often vested with discretion to impose a
sentence that falls within a particular range of months or years. Within that
range, the judge is free to make a rational judgment among the various
alternatives. If, on the other hand, the judge makes an irrational choice within
the range, for example, people with red hair should always get the maximum,
the choice will violate the reasonableness/rationality principle.
The reasonableness/rationality principle is actually a subset of the
reasonable jurist standard. An irrational choice is by definition an objectively
unreasonable one, for a reasonably competent jurist would not make such a
choice. Thus, if ajudge makes an irrational choice among otherwise available
sentencing alternatives, the judge's application of the law of sentencing is
objectively unreasonable because a prudent and careful jurist applying
professional standards of craft and competence would not have made that
23.

See, e.g., JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 317-29

(3d ed. 1998) (discussing rationality review in the context of agency rulemaking).
24. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,491 (1955).
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decision. The converse is not always true. A rational decision is not
necessarily an objectively reasonable one. If, for example, a judge decides to
sentence a particularly dangerous individual to a term of years that is clearly
beyond the statutory maximum, then the sentence may be a rational one given
the defendant's dangerousness, but given the judge's duty to comply with
clearly established law, it is not an objectively reasonable one.
This brings us to a somewhat perplexing question. The statutory text, in
modifying the noun "application," uses the adjective "unreasonable" and not the
adjective "incorrect." Given that a person can make a reasonable mistake, does
it follow that an objectively reasonable jurist can incorrectly apply the law? In
other words, can the judge be wrong as a matter of law, but nonetheless
reasonable? If so, the judge's decision will be immune from federal habeas.
My answer to those questions is "no" and "it depends." I begin with the "no"
answer. Theoretically, the law permits only two possibilities with respect to
any application. Either the application is correct or it is not. 25 We demand that
objectively reasonable jurists, acting competently and rationally, discover the
correct application. This is especially true in the context of criminal law. In
this sense, the notion of wrong-but-reasonable is an affront to our concept of
justice. To import such a notion into habeas review would require a textual
confidence that cannot be found within the word "unreasonable." Moreover, as
I discuss below, the legislative history of subsection (d)(1) starkly undermines
the wrong-but-reasonable thesis because the supporters of AEDPA
emphatically denied the possibility. Given that the text is at least ambiguous on
this score, that legislative history is of some significance. So, "no", the word
"unreasonable" does not imply or import a wrong-but-reasonable standard.
On the other hand, the theory of law just sketched above is in fact not
accurate. Law application does not always provide an obvious rule-bound,
determinate choice. Sometimes it speaks of degrees and through multifactored
tests. In such circumstances, its application may depend as much on intuition
as it does on reason. This is particularly true at the microscopic level of
application where the words used to describe a legal standard permit a range of
possibilities and call for the exercise of fact-specific and fact-dependent
judgment. That is not to say that such laws are indeterminate in the sense that
they are unbounded by anything other than the exercise of power. Rather, it
suggests that some laws may be underdeterminate in the sense that they are
rule-guided, but not rule-bound. 26 They instruct the law-applier as to what
(1986).

25.

RONALD DwoRK'N, LAW'S EMPIRE

26.

See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crises: CritiquingCriticalDogma,

54 U. Cin. L. REv. 462, 473 (1987) (describing how laws can be rule-guided but not rulebound).
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factors to consider, but do not necessarily provide a resolution for every
particular set of facts.
Theoretically, there is a right and a wrong answer to each legal question,
even with respect to underdeterminate laws. In fact, we may lack the ability to
pinpoint that answer with scientific certainty. For example, in any given capital
case, precisely how much investigation of mitigating circumstances must an
effective defense counsel pursue? On either side of the divide there will be
obvious answers, but in the middle range the resolution is not so clear. Here,
within this very narrow range of fine-tuned judgments that apply
underdeterminate laws, the unreasonableness standard may require a federal
judge to defer to a state court decision with which she disagrees but as to which
she cannot state with certainty that the state court was objectively wrong. This
is not to say that the state court decision is wrong-but-reasonable, but that given
the underdeterminate nature of the applicable legal principle and the factspecific nature of the particular problem, the decision must be upheld because it
is at least objectively reasonable and not clearly wrong.
In sum, an application of "clearly established" Supreme Court precedent is
"unreasonable" if the state court's decision reflects a judgment that an
objectively prudent, careful, and professionally competent jurist would not
make. Thus, an unreasonable application might occur if the judge fails to give
appropriate weight to a legally relevant factor, gives significant weight to an
irrelevant or improper factor, renders a decision that is implausible, arbitrary,
irrational, or that reflects a misunderstanding ofthe controlling legal principles,
or, more generally, renders a decision that is plainly at odds with the applicable
law or with accepted standards of judicial practice. Moreover, each of these
considerations must be examined through the lens of the relative determinacy
of the legal principles that are applied. Taking this all together, an
unreasonable application of the law involves a derogation of duty that reflects
something more than a mere disagreement between courts over the proper
resolution of a particular mixed question of law and fact. It reflects the failure
of one court to conform its judgment to the clear requisites of the law.27
27. Although the analogy is not perfect, the abuse of discretion standard used in the
context of administrative law provides a useful model for examining whether any particular
application of the law to the facts is unreasonable. Consistent with that standard, agency action
may be set aside if:
A. The agency relied on factors that may not be taken into account under, or
ignored factors that must be taken into account under, any authoritative source of
law ....
B. The action does not bear a reasonable relationship to statutory purposes or
requirements.
C. The asserted or necessary factual premises of the action do not withstand
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3. The Range of the Review Standards

The foregoing discussion identifies what might be characterized as a
spectrum of habeas review. That spectrum covers the full range of state court

decisions that may be challenged on "error-of-law" grounds. At one endpoint
are those pure law questions in which a state court decision fails to recognize a
controlling principle of clearly established Supreme Court precedent and

arrives at an outcome incompatible with that precedent-the second
combination described above. In these cases, the contrary-to standard of review
provides the proper measure of a federal court's power to grant habeas relief.
At the other end of the spectrum are those cases in which the state court
properly identifies the controlling principle of federal law but has arguably
misapplied it, that is, those cases that involve a mixed question of law and
fact-the fourth combination described above. Here, the "unreasonable
application" standard controls. In between these two endpoints are state court
decisions in which the state court appears to have correctly identified the
controlling principle of federal law but the state court's application of that
principle strongly suggests that the principle was profoundly misunderstood.
Here, we have an overlap of standards, for the misunderstanding suggests that
despite the proper identification, an incorrect principle may have actually been
applied. Suppose, for example, that a state court decision correctly identifies
the controlling Supreme Court precedent, but on facts virtually identical to
scrutiny under the relevant standard of review ....
D. The action is unsupported by any explanation or rests upon reasoning that is
seriously flawed.
E. The agency failed, without adequate justification, to give reasonable
consideration to an important aspect of the problems presented by the action ....
F. The action is,without legitimate reason and adequate explanation, inconsistent
with prior agency policies or precedents.
G. The agency failed, without an adequate justification, to consider or adopt an
important alternative solution to the problem addressed in the action.
H. The agency failed to consider substantial arguments, or respond to relevant and
significant comments, made by the participants in the proceeding that gave rise to
the agency action.
1. The agency has imposed a sanction that is greatly out of proportion to the
magnitude of the violation.
J. The action fails in other respects to rest upon reasoned decisionmaking.
American Bar Association Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, A
Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 42-43 (2002).

While each of the foregoing points may not be a perfect fit with our inquiry into judicial
reasonableness, the gist of these collected insights on the administrative abuse of discretion
standard does shed helpful light on the right questions to ask inthe context of the unreasonableapplication standard under § 2254(d)(1).

HABEAS STANDARDS OF REVIEW
those in the controlling precedent, it arrives at an opposite conclusion. Such a
decision can potentially be seen as both contrary to and an unreasonable
application of the controlling precedent because the state court either has
applied an incorrect principle or has grossly misunderstood the correct
principle.
4. The Legislative History of the "UnreasonableApplication" Standard
In the above discussion of the unreasonable-application standard, I alluded
to but rejected the possibility that the word "unreasonable" imported the
concept of "wrong-but-reasonable" into the federal law of habeas. I refer now
briefly to the legislative history of the "unreasonable application" standard for
the limited purpose of showing that my reading of the text on this point (as
described above) is fully consistent with what its authors and supporters
thought it conveyed. My goal here is not to establish the congressional intent
by reference to the views of individual legislators, but simply to show the
congruency between the text and the legislative history. I focus on this
particular language because there was some congressional debate on its
meaning and because opponents of the measure seemed to put a spin on it that
went beyond what the text demands and what the authors apparently intended.2 8
More particularly, a few members of Congress specifically expressed a concern
that the "unreasonable application" language might be read as establishing what
could be characterized as a wrong-but-reasonable standard. Essentially, they
assumed that a demonstrably incorrect application of federal law could still be
deemed reasonable and hence not reviewable on habeas. So read, AEDPA
would prevent federal courts from granting habeas when a state court decision
was wrong as a matter of federal law, but nonetheless reasonable (under some
undisclosed construction of that term). If this were true, and as some of the
critics pointed out, AEDPA would effect a remarkable alteration in the legal
landscape.2 9 However, the supporters of AEDPA expressly rejected this
interpretation.
28. For example, Anthony Lewis, a critic of proposed measures to reform habeas, argued
that the "unreasonable application" principle limited the grant of federal habeas to those cases in
which the state court decision was both incorrect and unreasonable. See Anthony Lewis, Mr.
Clinton's Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at A25 (claiming former President Clinton
changed his position to allow a limiting of federal habeas); Anthony Lewis, Is It a Zeal to Kill?,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1995 at A31 (admonishing federal steps to reign in habeas).
29. In the words of Senator Patrick Moynihan, "We are about to enact a statute which
would hold that constitutional protections do not exist unless they have been unreasonably
violated, an idea that would have confounded the framers. Thus we introduce a virus that will
surely spread throughout our system of laws." 142 CONG. REC. S3427-04, S3438 (1996).
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The wrong-but-reasonable critique was raised by three members of the
House who ultimately voted against the bill,30 and arguably by one who
supported it but who was of the view that this provision of AEDPA would and
should be held unconstitutional. 3 Congressman Henry Hyde, a cosponsor of
the bill in the House, rejected their interpretation, stating that "the Federal
judge always reviews the State court decision to see if it is in conformity with
established Supreme Court precedents, or if it has been misapplied. So it is not
a blank, total deference, but it is a recognition that you cannot relitigate these
issues endlessly. '3 2 Moreover, no House supporter of AEDPA appears to have
endorsed the wrong-but-reasonable interpretation of the proposed federal
review standards.
In the Senate, Senator Joseph Biden expressed similar reservations about a
wrong-but-reasonable federal review standard:
The second problem, in this instance, the bill seems to allow an exception
to the general rule [against granting habeas] but one that is likely to be
illusory because a claim can be granted only if the State court's application
of Federal law to the facts [is] not merely wrong but unreasonable. This is
an extraordinar[ily] deferential standard to the State courts, and I believe it
is an inappropriate one. It puts the Federal courts in the difficult position of
evaluating the reasonableness of a State court judge rather than simply
deciding whether or not he correctly applied the law, not whether he did it
reasonably. You can have a reasonable mistake. They could reasonably
conclude that on a constitutional provision, it should not apply, when in fact
the Supreme Court would rule it must apply. 3
In an immediate response to this criticism, Senator Orrin Hatch, a
cosponsor of the bill in the Senate, referred to a poster prepared by the Biden
staff, and explained:
It says that Specter-Hatch requires Federal courts to defer to State courts in
almost all cases, even if the State is wrong about the U.S. Constitution.
That is absolutely false. The fact of the matter is, currently, Federal courts
have virtual de novo review of a State court's legal determination. Under
30. 142 CONG. REc. H3599-01, H3603 (1996) (statement of Rep. J.C. Watts); id. at
H3612 (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters); id. at H3614 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); see
also id. at H3610 (statement of Rep. Howard Berman) (stating more general concern regarding
deference to state court decisions); id. at H3614 (statement of Rep. Nancy Pelosi) (stating that
the bill would severely limit the power of federal courts to issue habeas).
31. Id. at H3616 (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler).
32. Id. at H3602 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde) (emphasis added).
33. 141 CONG. REC. S7803-01, S7842 (1995) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden); cf 142
CONG. REC. S3454-01, S3458 (1996) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (arguing that the

unreasonable application principle requires federal court to defer to state court decision).
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our change, Federal courts would be required to defer to the determination
of state courts, unless the State court's decision was "contrary to or
involved in an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal laws
as determined by the Supreme Court."... This is a wholly appropriate
standard. It enables the Federal court to overturn State court positions that
clearly contravene Federal law. It further allows the Federal courts to
review State34court decisions that improperly apply clearly established
Federal law.
Hatch went on to explain that the subject language was designed to end
"the improper review of the State court decisions .... There is simply no
reason that Federal courts should have the ability to virtually retry cases that
have been properly adjudicated by our State courts."35 In other words, the
reform measures were not designed to divest federal courts of their habeas
review authority, but to prevent retrials of cases that have been "properly
adjudicated." In short, Senator Hatch, with an explanation similar to that made
by Congressman Hyde, rejected Senator Biden's wrong-but-reasonable
interpretation of the federal review standards, labeling that interpretation as
"false."
Senator Arlen Specter, also a cosponsor of the bill, expressed reservations
about the "unreasonable application" language, but ultimately concluded, "I
believe that the standard in the bill will allow Federal courts sufficient
discretion to ensure that convictions in State court have been obtained in
conformity with the Constitution. 3 6 A wrong-but-reasonable state court
decision would not, it seems, be in conformity with the Constitution.
On another occasion, Senator Hatch again sought to allay concerns
regarding the scope of the proposed federal review standard:
It enables the Federal court to overturn State court decisions that clearly
contravene Federal law. Indeed, this standard essentially gives the Federal
court the authority to review, de novo, whether the State court decided the
claim in contravention of Federal law. Moreover, the review standard
proposed allows the Federal courts to review State court decision [sic] that
improperly apply clearly established Federal law. In other words if the
State court unreasonably applied Federal laws, its determination is subject
to review by the Federal courts.37

34. 141 CONG. REc. S7803-01, at S7846 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (emphasis
added).
35. Id.
36. 142 CONG. REC. S3454-01, at S3472 (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
37. 142 CONG. REC. S3446-02, S3446 (1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (emphasis
added).
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Nothing in this language endorses a wrong-but-reasonable standard. In
fact, by equating "unreasonably" with "improperly," the statement strongly
suggests that an erroneous application of federal law can serve as a proper basis
for habeas. Consistent with this view, later in the same statement, Senator
Hatch observes, "The deference to state law is good, because it just means that
we defer to them if they have properly appliedfederal law."38 After hearing
Senator Hatch's remarks and in direct response to them, Senator Patrick
Moynihan, who had previously voiced concerns similar to those expressed by
Senator Biden, observed, "It is of some relief to hear the distinguished
manager's statement that the Great Writ will remain substantially intact."' '3409
Senator Hatch replied, "The Great Writ will not be affected by this one bit.
Senator Biden eventually accepted Senator Hatch's explanation as to the
scope of the federal review standards. In later remarks referring to the
proposed standards, Biden observed:
So if a State court makes an unconstitutional determination, the Federal
courts will, and should, continue to say so. Therefore, I think this is a much
less onerous-unnecessary but less onerous-than, in fact, it may appear on
its face. If a Federal court concludes the State court violated the Federal
Constitution, that, to me, is by definition-by definition-an unreasonable
application of the Federal law, and, therefore, Federal habeas corpus would
be able to be granted. 4'
Senator Hatch, who spoke immediately after Senator Biden, expressed no
disagreement with this view.4 2 Moments later, Biden announced his intention
to vote for the pending bill.4 Similarly, Senator Levin appears also to have
adopted what might be described as the Biden/Hatch/Specter interpretation of
the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" principles:
I interpret the new standard to give the Federal courts the final say as to
what the U.S. Constitution says. I reach this conclusion for two reasons.
First, several Members have raised the concern that the reference inthe bill
to an unreasonable application of Federal law could create two different
classes of constitutional violations-reasonable and unreasonable. I vote
for the bill because I have confidence that the Federal courts will not do
this. I believe the courts will conclude, as they should, that a constitutional

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.at S3447 (statement of Sen. Patrick Moynihan).
Id. (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
142 CONG. REc. S3454-01, S3475 (1996) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
Id.at S3475-S3476 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
Id. at S3476 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden).
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error cannot be reasonable and that if a State court decision is wrong, it
must necessarily be unreasonable."4
President Clinton's signing statement reflected a similar understanding of
the bill's language.4 s I have been unable to find any statements in the
Congressional Record made by supporters of this provision that contradict the
view expressed by Senators Biden, Hatch, Specter, and Levin.
In sum, to the extent that the legislative history is informative, it reveals
some concern that the "unreasonable application" standard of review might be
read to preclude federal court review of a state court decision that could be
described as wrong-but-reasonable. However, the sponsors of AEDPA
emphatically rejected such a reading of the proposed language. Instead, they
endorsed a view that gave the text a sensible, literal reading that leaves federal
courts with the power to grant habeas whenever a state court decision
contravenes clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court. Included within this power of review, as had long been the case, would
be those state court decisions reflecting an improper application of federal law.
In Senator Hatch's words, "The Great Writ will not be affected by this one bit."
Thus, if the text of § 2254(d)(1) is ambiguous with respect to the scope of the
review power embodied in the "unreasonable application" principle, the
foregoing legislative history seems to establish--one is tempted to say, "clearly
establishes"-that such a radically innovative wrong-but-reasonable standard
has no legitimate place within the sphere of interpretive possibilities.
Unfortunately, this legislative history provides little affirmative guidance
as to what "unreasonable application" does mean other than Senator Hatch's
description of an unreasonable application as an improper one. However, as
previously discussed, the textual use of the word "unreasonable" is not without
legal referents. Given those referents, an unreasonable (or improper)
application of the law would occur if the judge fails to apply an essential
element of controlling doctrine, undertakes an application that displays a
material misunderstanding of that doctrine, fails to attend to all facts relevant
under the terms of the doctrine, or, more generally, renders a decision that
under the circumstances cannot be described as competent and rational.

44. Id. at S3465 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
45. President's Statement on the Signing of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLv COMP. PRES. Doc. 719 (April 29, 1996) (stating, I have signed this
bill because I am confident that the Federal courts will interpret these provisions to preserve
independent review of Federal legal claims and the bedrock constitutional principle of an
independent judiciary.").
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III. The BaselineInterpretationsof the Supreme Court
The Court's first discussion of subsection (d)(1) occurred in Williams v.
Taylor,46 a case decided four years after the provision was enacted. Williams
was convicted in a Virginia state court of capital murder and sentenced to
death. In a state habeas proceeding, Williams claimed that during the
sentencing phase of his capital trial, his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel through their failure to investigate and present evidence in
mitigation. The state trial court agreed and ordered a new sentencing
proceeding. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that under the
standards of Strickland v. Washington47 and Lockhart v. Fretwell,48 Williams
had failed to establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Williams then filed a habeas petition in a Virginia federal court. That court
concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court decision involved an unreasonable
application of Strickland and Fretwell. As a consequence, the district court
granted the writ.
The Fourth Circuit reversed.49 It interpreted § 2254(d) as precluding
habeas relief unless the decision of the state court was either in "square
conflict" with Supreme Court precedent or, if there was no controlling
principle, the decision involved either an "unreasonable derivation of legal
principles from the relevant" Supreme Court precedents or represented an
50
"objectively unreasonable application of established principles to new facts.,
A decision would be considered unreasonable in either respect only if
"reasonable jurists would all agree" such to be the case. 5' Under that standard,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court had reasonably
applied the law to the facts. Note that in so ruling, the Fourth Circuit was not
employing an objective reasonable-jurist standard (prudent, careful, and
competent), but instead applied a subjective rational basis test.
46. Williams v.Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). The Court obliquely addressed the "clearly
established Federal law" standard in Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000). Id. at 367.
However, the bulk of the Court's brief opinion focuses on the lack of merit in the claims
presented for review. The Court explains that the habeas petitioner's interpretation of the
relevant precedent was, in the Court's view, incorrect. Id. at 377. Given that the law was not
what the petitioner argued it to be, it followed that the habeas petition was not premised on a
violation of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Id. at 399. The Court, therefore, affirmed the court of appeal's refusal to issue a
certificate of appealability. Id.
47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
48. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993),
49. Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 874 (4th Cir. 1998).
50. Id. at 865.

51.

Id.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed by a six to three margin. An
understanding of this decision is complicated by the array of opinions and by
the floating line-upsjoining various parts of different opinions. Justice Stevens
announced the judgment of the Court and spoke for six members of the Court
in his application of the subsection (d)(1) review standards (Parts III & IV of
his opinion).52 His description of those standards, however, represented the
views of only four Justices (Part II ofhis opinion).5" Justice O'Connor wrote a
concurring opinion, Part H of which was announced as an opinion for the
Court, having been joined by Justice Kennedy and the three dissenters. In this
section of her opinion, Justice O'Connor provided an interpretation of the
review standards that differed from that provided by Justice Stevens. Yet,
despite the apparent disagreement between the Stevens plurality and the
O'Connor majority, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice Stevens in
his application of the review standards. Given that the law as applied is
sometimes the best gauge of the content of the law, the Court's view on the
scope of the review standards is at least enigmatic. Presumably, the law
established by the Williams decision lurks somewhere between these two
interlocking majorities of description (Justice O'Connor's Part II) and
application (Justice Stevens's Part II).
A. Clearly EstablishedFederalLaw, as Determinedby the Supreme Court
Justice Stevens's plurality opinion describes the "clearly established
Federal law" requirement of§ 2254(d)(1) as the "functional equivalent" of the
"new rule" principle adopted in Teague.14 According to Justice Stevens, "It is
perfectly clear that AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that Teague requires
federal habeas courts to deny relief that is contingent upon a rule of law not
clearly established at the time the state conviction became final.""5 In so
concluding, Stevens reads the text from the perspective of the pertinent
52. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-98 (2000) (applying subsection (d)(l)
review standards).

53. Id. at 374-90.
54. Id. at 379. In Teague v.Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Court, in aplurality opinion,
held that habeas relief will not be available to a petitioner who relies on a "new rule" of law
unless that rule places the proscription of certain kinds of primary, private conduct beyond the
power of the government, or unless the new rule isone that is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. The post-Teague Court defined a "new rule" as one that "was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Gilmore v.Taylor, 508 U.S. 333,
340 (1993) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,412 (1990), quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989), in turn quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).
55. Williams, 529 U.S. at 380.
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background legal principles. And while he does not explain this conclusion in
any detail, the intuition appears to be sound. As explained in Part II.A. 1, the
text of § 2254(d)(1) precludes a habeas petitioner from relying on federal law
that has not been established by pre-existing Supreme Court precedent. Under
Teague, a habeas petitioner is precluded from relying on federal law that is not
"dictated by precedent" at the time of the state court decision. There would
seem to be no significant difference between these two standards. Thus, if as
Justice Stevens contends, Teague and AEDPA represent "congruent concepts,"
it seems to follow that an "old rule" under Teague is a "clearly established" one
under AEDPA.56
Next, Justice Stevens discusses the standards for measuring whether a
federal law has been clearly established. In Stevens's words, "[R]ules of law
may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes even when they are expressed in
terms of a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule. 5 7 He
continues by quoting Justice Kennedy:
If the rule in question is one which of necessity requires a case-by-case
examination of the evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific
applications without saying that those applications themselves create a new
rule ....Where the beginning point is a rule of this general application, a
rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual
contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it
forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.5 8
Thus, in Stevens's view, if a claim is based on existing precedent, unless that
claim "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation," it will be deemed
clearly established. 9
These passages might be a little confusing. As was noted previously, the
adverb "clearly" modifies the adjective "established."
Thus, from a
grammatical perspective, this phrase has nothing to do with the clarity of the
60
law. Rather, it pertains to the status of the law under a rule of recognition.
Yet, what Stevens is referring to is not so much the clarity of the legal principle
but how one measures the "newness" of that principle for the purposes of
Teague. His point is that a recognized rule of general applicability may be
deemed clearly established over a diverse array of factual scenarios unless the
particular application breaks new ground. In other words, Stevens would not
56.

Id.

57. Id. at 382.
58. Id. (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277,308-09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
59.
60.

Id. at 381.
See supra Part iI.A.2 (explaining the phrase "as determined by the Supreme Court").
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necessarily limit the scope of a clearly established principle to the precise facts
and circumstances of the relevant precedent. Here, he seems to be recognizing
that even underdeterminate principles of law can be clearly established.
Finally, Justice Stevens notes that AEDPA has added, immediately
following the "clearly established law" requirement, a clause limiting the area
of relevant law to that determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
If the Court has not broken sufficient legal ground to establish an asked-for
constitutional principle, the lower federal courts cannot themselves establish
such a principle with clarity sufficient to satisfy the AEDPA bar. 6' Groundbreaking lower court law, in and of itself, therefore, cannot serve as the basis
for habeas review under § 2254(d)(1). This conclusion directly comports with
the text of § 2254(d)(1) as discussed in Part II.A.3, supra.
Part II of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Williams, that is, her opinion for
the Court, focuses almost exclusively on the meaning to be attributed to the
"contrary to, or involved in an unreasonable application of' standards of
§ 2254(d)( 1).6' However, it did include a short paragraph addressing the
"clearly established Federal law" requirement:
Throughout this discussion the meaning of the phrase "clearly established
Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court ofthe United States" has
been put to the side. That statutory phrase refers to the holdings, as
opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant
state-court decision. In this respect, the "clearly established Federal law"
phrase bears only a slight connection to our Teague jurisprudence. With
one caveat, whatever would qualify as an old rule under our Teague
jurisprudence will constitute "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" under § 2254(d)(1).
The one caveat, as the statutory language makes clear, is that § 2254(d)(1)
restricts the source of clearly established law to this Court's
jurisprudence.63
This is a somewhat enigmatic paragraph. The second sentence, with its
reference to "holdings, as opposed to the dicta," seems clear enough. Clearly
established principles of federal law for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) are those that
can be distilled from holdings and not spun from dicta. As we will see in the
next paragraph, Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens are essentially in
agreement on this point when they jointly conclude that the broad standards of
Strickland v. Washington are clearly established. Those standards are extracted
from the holding in Strickland. The third and fourth sentences of the quoted
61.
62.
63.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000).
Id. at 402-13.
Id. at 412.
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paragraph, however, are baffling. The third sentence suggests that Teague has
only marginal relevance to the "clearly established" inquiry, and this marginal
relevance is somehow related to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta" concept.
On the other hand, the very next sentence unequivocally states that an old rule
under Teague constitutes "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA.
Thus, O'Connor seems to both disparage and endorse Justice Stevens's
functional equivalence argument. One commentator has interpreted these
sentences as suggesting that while old rules constitute clearly established
federal law, the realm of clearly established federal law may encompass more
than old rules.6 It may include some "new rules" within the meaning of
Teague. This is a plausible interpretation of O'Connor's text, but as of this
writing the Court does not appear to have taken this more flexible course.
Finally, the paragraph ends with an assertion that lower court precedent cannot
be used to satisfy the clearly established federal law requirement. On this point
the Court is unanimous.
That brings us to Part III of Justice Stevens's opinion, which also is an
opinion for the Court, representing the views of six Justices. Here, Justice
Stevens applies the "clearly established Federal law" principle. Williams, as
noted above, claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel "when
his trial lawyers failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating
evidence to the sentencing jury. 6 5 "The threshold question under AEDPA,"
according to Justice Stevens, was "whether Williams seeks to apply a rule of
law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became
final., 66 Because Williams relied on Strickland v. Washington, this question
was easily resolved:
It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." That the Strickland test "of necessity requires a case-by-case
examination of the evidence," Wright, 505 U.S., at 308 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment), obviates neither the clarity of the rule nor the
extent to which the rule must be seen as "established" by this Court. This
Court's precedent "dictated" that the Virginia Supreme Court apply the
Strickland test at the time that court entertained Williams' ineffectiveassistance claim. Teague, 489 U.S., at 301. And it can hardly be said that
recognizing the right to effective
67 counsel "breaks new ground or imposes a
new obligation on the States.,
64.
65.
66.
67.

Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 Thx. L. REv. 1731, 1752-53 (2000).
Williamns, 529 U.S. at 390.
Id.
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This majority application of the statutory language conforms precisely to
Justice Stevens's description of the "clearly established" standard in his
plurality opinion. It embodies his view of the relevance of Teague, at least in
the sense that an old law is a clearly established law, as well as his view that a
rule of law premised on Supreme Court precedent will be deemed clearly
established unless the application sought by the petitioner "breaks new ground
or imposes a new obligation on the states." It is also consistent with Justice
O'Connor's view that clearly established federal law must be derived from the
holdings of Supreme Court precedent. Finally, it is worth noting that the "law"
of Strickland is underdeterminate in the sense that it provides guidelines for
determining the circumstances under which ineffective assistance of counsel
may be established, but it does not provide bright-line solutions for each factspecific case.
Some further insight as to the majority's view of what constitutes clearly
established federal law can be gleaned from the Court's decision in Ramdass v.
Angelone,6 8 decided shortly after Williams. While none of the three opinions in
that case-a plurality, a concurrence, and a dissent-discusses the "clearly
established Federal law" standard, the case does involve an application of
§ 2254(d)(1), and the Court majority treats the relevant Supreme Court
precedent in a manner consistent with Justice O'Connor's "holdings, as
opposed to the dicta" standard. Unlike Williams, however, Ramdass did not
involve a principle of general application calling for a case-by-case analysis.
Rather, at issue in Ramdass was the scope of a single fact-specific precedent,
6 9 In Simmons,
Simmons v. South Carolina.
the Court held that due process
entitles a parole-ineligible defendant in a capital case to inform the sentencing
jury of that ineligibility when the prosecution puts the defendant's future
dangerousness at issue. According to the Ramdass majority, that is, the
plurality and the concurrence, this "clearly established Federal law" was not
controlling under the facts presented. This was so because the petitioner in
Ramdass was not technically parole-ineligible on the date of his capital
sentencing, for the conviction on which his ineligibility was premised had not
yet been entered as a judgment. The entry of thatjudgment came nineteen days
later. In essence, both the plurality and the concurrence concluded that
Simmons established a bright-line rule that was triggered only when the
defendant was parole ineligible as a matter of state law at the time the jury was
asked to consider his future dangerousness. Justice O'Connor, concurring in
the judgment, concluded, "I believe the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was
68.
69.

Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000).
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
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neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, our holding in
Simmons."7 ° In short, the majority in Ramdass confined the "clearly
established Federal law" to the fact-specific precedent in which the principle
had been established. In this sense, the Ramdass decision also conforms to the
"new rule" principle derived from Teague. At least from the perspective of the
Court majority, one could say that the extension of Simmons to the facts
presented in Ramdass would have broken new ground and imposed new
obligations on the states.
The Court's decision in Bell v. Cone7 is also moderately instructive,
though the Court did not expressly apply § 2254(d)(1). In Bell, the habeas
petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of a
capital case and sought to rely on the presumed prejudice standard described in
United States v. Chronic." The petitioner's theory, derived directly from
Chronic,was that his "counsel entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case
to meaningful adversarial testing."03 The facts, at least arguably, seemed to
warrant that view. Petitioner's counsel apparently lost hope and gave up during
the sentencing phase. Among other things, he failed to adduce mitigating
evidence and failed to make a closing argument.7 4 The Court, however,
focused on the word "entirely" and held, in essence, that the clearly established
principle was narrower than the petitioner asserted. It applied only when "the
attorney's failure was complete." 75 Bell's attorney had not been completely
inactive during the sentencing phase. Therefore, Bell was not entitled to rely on
the presumed prejudice standard. While one can see Bell as a case in which the
Court simply disagreed with a party's characterization of the law or facts, it also
provides some insight into the Court's perception of the clearly established
standard. Thus, while in Ramdass the Court focused on the fact-specific
holding of the relevant precedent, in Bell the Court focused on a specific word
from the previous precedent. In each case, the result was that the "clearly
established Federal law" was insufficiently broad to support the habeas
petitioner's claim.
From the perspective of precedent, two things are absolutely certain with
respect to the "clearly established Federal law" principle. The law must be
embodied in a Supreme Court precedent and that precedent must predate the
70.

Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 181 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

71. Bell v.Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
72. United States v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
73. Id. at 659 (1984).
74.

Bell, 535 U.S. at 691; see also id. at 703-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the

attorneys' failure warranted relief).
75. Id. at 697.
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judgment of conviction of the person seeking habeas. The standard for
determining whether a law has been clearly established also appears to be
reasonably certain. The view expressed in Part III of Justice Stevens's opinion
in Williams adopts the "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation"
standard of Teague. That being the majority view, a law is clearly established
if it does not violate the Teague standard. On this score, Williams and
Ramdass/Bell differ only due to the nature of the precedent the habeas
petitioner seeks to enforce. Ramdass involved the scope of a single, factspecific precedent and Bell involved what the Court perceived as a narrow
exception to Strickland,while Williams involved a long-established precedent
calling for a case-by-case application of a broadly conceived legal principle.
One could say that in the context of a single, fact-specific precedent or a
narrowly confined principle, that is, relatively determinate laws, every
significant extension of the precedent or principle breaks new ground. A
broadly conceived principle of general application, that is, an underdeterminate
law, covers a range of factual scenarios and requires no extension to
accommodate cases falling within that range. Where a particular claim falls
within this spectrum of possibilities between the fact-specific and the rule of
general application, therefore, may be of some significance. In general, the
Court's initial interpretations of the "clearly established Federal law" principle
appear wholly consistent with the text of subsection (d)(1).
B. Contrary to or Involved an UnreasonableApplication Of
1. As Applied in Williams v. Taylor
Williams also provides the Court's baseline interpretation of the "contrary
to" and "unreasonable application" federal review standards. As was true of the
Court's interpretation of the "clearly established Federal law" principle, the
Court's interpretation of the federal review standards is complicated by the
relationship between the respective descriptions of those standards found in the
Stevens plurality and the O'Connor majority, and in the Stevens majority's
application of them.
One senses that Justice Stevens's plurality opinion is built on an
assumption that any endorsement of an independent unreasonable-application
standard would, to some degree, endorse the wrong-but-reasonable principle.
Attempting to avoid this possibility, he rejects what might be called the
"independent" standard thesis. Under that thesis, pure questions of law are
examined under the contrary-to standard, while mixed questions of law and fact
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are examined under the unreasonable-application standard.76 Justice Stevens
disagreed. "We are not," he says, "persuaded that the phrases define two
mutually exclusive categories of questions. ' 7 Of course, the fact that the
categories are not mutually exclusive does not mean they are identical or
designed for identical purposes. Having rejected the different use thesis,
however, Justice Stevens's discussion proceeds to a conceptual level that
emphasizes the overlap between the two standards. Of course, he is correct.
There certainly is overlap, but this observation does not obviate the necessity of
examining the text to discover any potential reason for treating these standards
independently (other than a fear of what one might find). In any event, having
found an overlap, he concludes that the contrary-to standard establishes a
recognizable and centrifugal principle of federal review, namely, "independent"
review by the federal courts.7" The unreasonable-application standard is
essentially subsumed within this principle, reasserting itself only as a "mood"
that admonishes federal courts to respect state court judgments. 79 As Justice
Stevens explains,
Otherwise the federal "law as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States" might be applied by the federal courts one way in Virginia
and another way in California. In light of the well-recognized interest in
ensuring that federal courts interpret federal law in a uniform way, we are
convinced that Congress did not intend the statute to produce such a
result.8°
The primary problem with Justice Stevens's textual analysis is that there is
very little of it. Instead of analyzing the text, the opinion talks around the text
in an apparent effort to avoid certain implications. As I hope I have
demonstrated, there is a readily-available, sensible reading of § 2254(d)(1) that
in no way requires one to import a wrong-but-reasonable standard into the text.
Nor does it require one to ignore any part of the text. Thus, even if the wrongbut-reasonable standard represents a plausible interpretation of the text, which I
very much doubt,8 ' there are equally plausible interpretations that do not import
that standard. Justice Stevens certainly could have addressed those possibilities
and explained why they might be preferred over the wrong-but-reasonable
76. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 384 (2000).
77. Id.

78. Id.at 389.
79. Id. at 385-86.
80. Id. at 389-90.
81. See supra Part ll.B.4 (arguing that the legislative history of § 2254 does not support
reading the wrong-but-reasonable standard into the federal law of habeas).
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standard. Instead, he opts for a unified standard that essentially disrespects the
text by treating two alternative standards as one.
Despite these criticisms, Justice Stevens's opinion does reflect sound legal
intuition. His legitimate worry over the wrong-but-reasonable standard leads
him to search for a more coherent alternative to that potentially radical and
arguably incoherent reworking of the law of habeas. And at the same time he
expressly recognizes that the nuances of the law as applied require a sensible
deference to state court decisions. "We all agree that state-court judgments
must be upheld unless, after the closest examination of the state-court
judgment, a federal court is firmly convinced that a federal constitutional right
has been violated. 82 This observation seems to embrace some independent
utility for the unreasonable-application standard. Thus, more generally
considered, his opinion appears to be searching for a middle ground between
draconian federal oversight and virtual abdication of federal court
responsibility. This may be precisely what the text of subsection (d)(1) seeks to
achieve. Stevens simply fails to see the textual path to that end.
As noted above, Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion for the Court with
respect to the scope of the federal review standards.8 3 Her key criticism of the
Stevens opinion was that it:
fails to give independent meaning to both the "contrary to" and
"unreasonable application" clauses of the statute. By reading § 2254(d)(1)
as one general restriction on the power of the federal habeas court, Justice
Stevens manages to avoid confronting the specific meaning of the statute's
"unreasonable application" clause and its ramifications for the independentreview rule."

82. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 389 (2000).
83. Justice O'Connor begins her critique of Justice Stevens's interpretation ofthe federal
review standards by arguing that his interpretation merely reiterates prior law, thereby rendering
subsection (d)(1) of no effect. Williams, 529 U.S. at 403-04. This is not entirely correct.
Subsection (d)(1), under both the Stevens and O'Connor interpretations, works a major change
in the scope of habeas by limiting the availability of the writ to claims premised on a violation
of clearly established Supreme Courtprecedent. No longer may lower federal court precedent
serve as a basis for habeas relief. Thus, the proclivities of any so-called liberal circuits are
effectively reined in. One can certainly argue that this is the major change rendered by
subsection (d)(I). Itembodies the "new law" principle of Teague with a choker. Moreover, the
fact that a statute reflects principles previously adopted by the Court, such as the longstanding
principle of independent federal review, does not render a statute meaningless even in the
absence of other changes. The congressional endorsement of ajudicially created doctrine lends
political credence and support to that doctrine. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2001) (concerning
supplemental jurisdiction embodying the judicially created principles of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction).
84. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404.
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O'Connor then goes on to adopt a textually premised "independent
standards" interpretation of subsection (d)(1). "The word 'contrary,"'
according to Justice O'Connor, "is commonly understood to mean
'diametrically different,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually
opposed."' 85 Consistent with this interpretation, the contrary-to standard is
satisfied, that is, transgressed, if "the state court applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in our cases. 8 6 As such, Justice O'Connor's
interpretation conforms closely to the text. It also parallels the textual analysis
described in Part II.B. 1, reflecting the "second combination" of state court
decisions in which the state court adopts an incorrect federal standard and
arrives at an incorrect outcome. Undoubtedly, a state court decision that
"contradicts the governing law" is incompatible with that law and, hence,
contrary to that law. But she then takes the contrary-to standard a step further
by concluding that a state decision is also contrary to clearly established and
binding precedent "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a
result different from our precedent. 817 This is a revealing move. It slides the
contrary-to standard into the realm of unreasonable applications. Surely a state
court decision can be said to have unreasonably applied binding precedent
when it arrives at an opposite result on materially indistinguishable facts. This
is not to say, however, that O'Connor's contrary-to standard swallows the
unreasonable-application standard, but to recognize, at least implicitly, that the
standards do overlap, just as pure questions of law and mixed questions of law
and fact sometimes overlap. In this sense, the state court decision described by
Justice O'Connor is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law.
That brings Justice O'Connor to the independent unreasonable-application
standard. "[A] run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal
rule from our cases to the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit comfortably
within § 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause."88 By definition, the law applied is
"in accord" with the controlling legal authority, hence, not contrary to that
authority, and even if the state court achieves the incorrect result, it would, in
Justice O'Connor's view, be "difficult ... to describe.., the decision as
'diametrically different' from, 'opposite in character or nature' from, or

85. Id. at 405.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 406.
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'mutually opposed' to... our clearly established precedent."8 9 This view may
sound familiar. It is the position described earlier with respect to the "fourth
combination" of state-court decisions, namely, those in which the state court
adopts the correct standard but arrives at an incorrect result. 90 The "contrary to"
language simply fails to describe fully the relationship between the state court
decision and the principle of federal law. On the other hand, the unreasonableapplication standard is a perfect fit. Thus, Justice O'Connor quite reasonably
concludes that "run-of-the-mill" application problems ought to be examined
under the unreasonable-application standard.
Her conclusion here, when combined with her definition of "contrary to,"
leads to a textually consistent and elegant universe of review standards. She
has, in essence, created a spectrum of "review" possibilities, ranging from
decisions that are measured exclusively under the contrary-to standard (failure
to properly identify and apply the controlling precedent), to those that may be
amenable to resolution under either standard (failure to conform a decision to a
materially indistinguishable and controlling precedent), and to those that are
measured exclusively under the unreasonable-application standard (failure to
apply properly the controlling, but not materially indistinguishable precedent).
The only question that remains is to determine when decisions falling into the
latter category are "unreasonable." Having created this spectrum, she reminds
us, almost unnecessarily, that Justice- Stevens's approach "saps the
'unreasonable application' clause of any meaning." 91 She is right.
As to the definition of unreasonableness, recall that the Fourth Circuit in
Williams held that a decision would be deemed unreasonable only if
"reasonable jurists would all agree" that to be the case. 92 This is not an
objective reasonable jurist standard. Rather, it is a subjective rationality
standard. Justice O'Connor rejects it as such. 93 In so doing, she opts for what
she describes as an objective standard of unreasonableness.9 4 Of course, an
irrational decision by a state court would violate any objective standard of
unreasonableness (or reasonableness), but, as Justice O'Connor's rejection of
the Fourth Circuit standard suggests, a merely rational decision is not
necessarily an objectively reasonable one. Her judgment here appears to be

89,
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Supra Part If.B.1.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000).
Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 865 (4th Cir. 1998).
Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
Id.
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wholly consistent
with the relevant usages of the word "reasonable" in other
95
contexts.
legal
Justice O'Connor does not define what she means by "objectively
unreasonable," essentially leaving that task to a case-by-case determination. As
we will see, this lack of a definition remains a problem. However, she does
observe "that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law. 9 6 From a textual perspective, her
explanation for this conclusion is that Congress chose the word "unreasonable"
over terms like "erroneous" or "incorrect." By so observing, Justice O'Connor
did not quite endorse a wrong-but-reasonable standard. Rather, she merely
posits that an unreasonable application differs from an incorrect one. This is
obviously true. The words are not synonymous. In this sense, Justice
O'Connor's Williams opinion can be read as simply directing us to the proper
question, that is, do not ask whether the state court decision was incorrect, but
whether it was objectively reasonable.97 It would seem, however, that whether
a decision is objectively unreasonable is at least partially dependent on whether
the decision was incorrect. Surely, a state court decision cannot be labeled
objectively unreasonable in the absence of error. Similarly, one would think
that an objectively incorrect decision would by definition be an objectively
unreasonable one. So, yes, the unreasonable-application standard does require
one to ask a particular question, but asking that question does not eliminate the
necessity of inquiring into any potential underlying error. Of course, the mere
discovery of error will not itself resolve the inquiry.
In my discussion of the meaning to be attributed to the word
"unreasonable," I referenced three possibilities. The first was an objective
reasonable jurist standard, the second was a rationality standard incorporated
into the first, and the third was a standard of deference that applies when
definitively correct answers are not a practical possibility under what can be
described as underdeterminate laws.98 That third possibility is also
incorporated in the reasonable jurist standard. This is so because objectively
reasonable jurists might rationally disagree over the "correct" result under a
given set of facts as measured against an underdeterminate legal standard.
Within this third realm, a federal judge might perceive the "correct" outcome in
one fashion, while an objectively reasonable state judge might perceive it in
95.
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another. Under a de novo standard of review, the federal judge's perception
would always prevail. Under the unreasonable-application standard it may not.
Within the context of underdeterminate laws, there is, in essence, no superior
authority when the law does not mandate a particular result.
The critical question, then, is under what circumstances might an
objectively reasonable jurist arrive at a conclusion that is perceived as incorrect
but which is nonetheless entitled to deference? If those circumstances arise
only in the context of laws that permit a range of judgments over which
objectively reasonable jurists could rationally disagree, then we have arrived at
a subtle construction of § 2254(d)(1) that is consistent with text, legislative
history, and a reasonably sophisticated understanding of the law. If, on the
other hand, objective reasonableness operates as a blunt instrument to shield
state court decisions from federal review, that is, a general rule of deference,
then we have arrived at a position that is neither commanded by the text nor
consistent with the legislative history of that text, and which represents a radical
departure from our understanding of the law and the role of federal courts in
enforcing principles of federal law. Justice O'Connor's opinion does not
provide any clue as to her answer to this critical inquiry.
That brings us back to Justice Stevens. In his plurality opinion, he states
that the difference between his interpretation of the federal review standards
and that of Justice O'Connor is scant at best. He may be right. Justice
O'Connor's insistence on asking the right question will quite likely affect only
those cases at the margin, that is, so long as her standard is properly understood
as one that demands a particular question-was the decision objectively
reasonable?-and not one that more generally endorses or invites a wrong-butreasonable standard. We can see the commonalities between the Stevens and
O'Connor approaches by comparing Part IV of Justice Stevens's opinion,
which is an opinion for the Court joined by Justice O'Connor, with Justice
O'Connor's separate endorsement of that opinion.
Recall that the underlying question in Williams was whether defense
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present
mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital case. The evidence
plainly established that counsel had failed to discover substantial mitigating
-evidence pertaining to Williams's horrendous childhood. In concluding that
counsel had not been ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v.
Washington, the Virginia Supreme Court committed two potential errors. First,
it adopted a novel interpretation of Strickland that significantly limited the
scope of that decision. Next, it applied the prejudice prong of Strickland
without, as required by Stricklandand its progeny, fully examining the totality
of the mitigating evidence.
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Justice Stevens, speaking for the Court, first held that the Virginia
Supreme Court had misinterpreted the applicable standards. Simply put, "The
trial judge analyzed the ineffective-assistance claim under the correct standard;
the Virginia Supreme Court did not."99 Or, in Justice O'Connor's words, "[A]s
the Court ably explains, the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was contrary to
Strickland."'°0 In short, where a state court decision gets the clearly established
Supreme Court precedent wrong and as a consequence arrives at an incorrect
outcome, subsection (d)(1) permits a federal court to grant habeas, a classic
example of the second combination-incorrect federal standard and incorrect
outcome.
Next, on the "totality of the mitigating evidence" issue, the Court held that
the state court's application of the prejudice standard was unreasonable. "[T]he
State Supreme Court's prejudice determination was unreasonable insofar as it
failed to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence-both that
adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceedings-in
reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation. " '1 Moreover, "the state
court failed even to mention the sole argument in mitigation that trial counsel
did advance-Williams turned himself in, alerting police to a crime they
otherwise would never have discovered, expressing remorse for his actions, and
cooperating with the police after that.' 0 2 Stevens goes on to explain that this
evidence, coupled with other evidence adduced at habeas,
"might well have
03
influenced the jury's appraisal of his moral culpability."
One could say, from the perspective of an objective reasonable jurist
standard, that given the Stricklandstandards, a prudent, careful, and competent
jurist would not have failed to consider the totality of the evidence of mitigation
in determining whether prejudice had been established. Or, as Justice
O'Connor phrased it, "The Virginia Supreme Court's decision reveals an
obviousfailure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence."'04
Hence, one can say that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision was objectively
unreasonable because a prudent, careful and competent jurist would have
understood the Strickland standards to require a consideration of the totality of
the evidence of mitigation. In a sense, the Virginia Supreme Court's decision
revealed a misunderstanding of the clearly established principles.'0 5
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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2. As Applied in Penry v. Johnson
The unreasonable-application standard was also revealingly applied by the
Court in Penry v. Johnson (Penry II).'06 Johnny Paul Penry was convicted of
capital murder and sentenced to death in 1980. In Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry
1),107 the Supreme Court vacated his sentence because the trial court failed to
instruct the jury on its duty to consider the evidence in mitigation introduced
during the penalty phase of that proceeding. In fact, the nature of the
instructions seemed to suggest that the evidence in mitigation was irrelevant.
Penry was retried and again sentenced to death. After being denied relief by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Penry sought federal habeas on two grounds,
one pertaining to the Fifth Amendment and the other pertaining to jury
instructions that the court gave during the second penalty phase hearing.
The Fifth Amendment claim was premised on a violation of the principles
established in Estelle v. Smith,'0 8 where the Court held that the introduction of
"uncounseled" statements made to a court-appointed psychiatrist violated the
defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. During the Penry II penalty phase, a
clinical neuropsychologist, Dr. Price, testified on Penry's behalf. In preparing
to testify, Dr. Price relied, among other things, on a psychiatric evaluation of
Penry prepared by another defense psychiatrist. That evaluation was prepared
for use in a competency proceeding in a rape case that took place before the
murder in question. On cross-examination, Dr. Price was required to read a
portion of the prior report that stated the evaluator's "professional opinion that
if Johnny Paul Penry were released from custody, that he would be dangerous
to other persons."' 9 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Penry's
claim that introduction of this evidence violated the Fifth Amendment. On
federal habeas, the Supreme Court first distinguished Estelle on several
grounds."o Unlike Penry, the defendant in Estelle had not placed his mental
condition at issue. Next, in Estelle, the state chose the examining psychiatrist
and called that psychiatrist to testify as part of its affirmative case. Finally, the
defendant in Estelle had been charged with a capital crime at the time the
evaluation was undertaken. As to whether the state courts were objectively
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
clearly established Supreme Court precedent because, inessence, the Virginia Supreme Court
correctly applied that precedent).
106. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
107. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
108. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
109. Penry I!,
532 U.S. at 788.
110. Id.at 794.
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unreasonable in failing to extend Estelle to the facts of Penry II, the Court
explained:
The differences between this case and Estelle are substantial, and the
Court's Estelle opinion suggested that its holding was limited to the
"distinct circumstances" presented there. It also indicated that the Fifth
Amendment analysis might be different where a defendant introduces
psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase. Indeed, the Court has never
extended Estelle's Fifth Amendment holding beyond its particular facts. It
therefore cannot be said that it was objectively unreasonable for the Texas
court to conclude that Penry's not entitled to relief on his Fifth Amendment
claim. "'
While the Court did not say that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
correct in its evaluation of Penry's Estelle claim, it came very close to doing so.
At a minimum, the Court's opinion in Penry II makes it clear that the Texas
court was not definitively, clearly, or even probably incorrect. It should,
therefore, be evident that the reasonableness of the Texas court's decision is at
least partially related to the Supreme Court's view of the merits.
The second issue in Penry II asked whether the jury instructions given
during the second penalty phase conformed to the mandate of PenryL Hence,
some further background on Penry I is necessary. In Penry , the trial court
instructed the jury that it was required to answer three statutorily mandated
issues. If a juror found that the issue was established beyond a reasonable
doubt, the juror was required to vote "yes" on that issue. If each issue was
answered "yes" by the entire jury, then the death penalty would be imposed.
None of the statutorily mandated issues permitted the consideration of
mitigating evidence, even though Penry's counsel had introduced such
evidence during the penalty phase. The Court in PenryIheld that the failure to
instruct on mitigating evidence was fatal. "[A] reasonable juror could well
have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did
not deserve to be sentenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence."" 2
The jury instructions in PenryII were identical to the jury instructions in
Penry I except that the jury was also given a "supplemental" instruction on
mitigating evidence. This instruction did not, however, explain how the
mitigating evidence was to be folded into the consideration of the statutorily
mandated issues. It ended with the following admonition:
If you determine, when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that
a life sentence, as reflected by a negative finding to the issue under
Ill.

Id. at 795 (citations omitted).

112.

Penry !,492 U.S. at 326.
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consideration, rather than a death sentence, is an appropriate response to
the personal culpability of the defendant, a negative finding should be given

to one of the special issues.

In essence, this instruction allowed the jurors to nullify the instructions on the
statutorily mandated issues. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld these
instructions as being consistent with Penry L
The Supreme Court concluded that the state court's decision was
objectively unreasonable. To the extent that the Texas court concluded that the
mere giving of a supplemental instruction on mitigation was sufficient, "the
Texas court clearly misapprehended our prior decision."'" 13 The key under
Penry I was that a "jury be able to 'consider and give effect to [a defendant's
mitigating] evidence in imposing sentence.""'14 To the extent that the Texas
court concluded that the supplemental instruction satisfied the standards of
Penry I, it was wrong. The gist of the Court's ruling on this point is that "it
would have been both logically and ethically impossible for a juror to follow
both sets of instructions."" 5 In other words, in order to follow the
supplemental instruction the jurors would have to violate their oath to follow
the instructions on the statutorily mandated issues.
Although the Court thoroughly explains why it thinks the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals was wrong, the Court never explains why this perceived error
in the application of the Penry I standards was objectively unreasonable. To be
sure, the Court does state that "to the extent the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that the substance of the jury instructions given at Penry's
second sentencing hearing satisfied our mandate in PenryI, that determination
was objectively unreasonable." ' 16 But there is no further explanation. Instead
the Court's conclusion is immediately followed by a "Cf." citation to a case in
which a state court decision had "incorrectly limited" a prior Supreme Court
precedent. Also, later in the same paragraph, the Court describes the PenryII
supplemental instruction as "ineffective and illogical."" 7 More generally,
however, the Court provides no other clue as to the content of the objectivelyunreasonable standard.
It is interesting to note that despite the Williams admonition that
"unreasonable" is not synonymous with "incorrect," the Penry II Court's
perception of objective unreasonableness is premised largely, if not completely,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001).
Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)).
Id. at 799.
Id. at 803-04.
Id. at 804.
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on the perceived error committed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The
essence of the Penry Ilholding is that the Texas court "incorrectly limited" the
mandate of Penry L There is, quite plainly, some tension between this aspect
of PenryII and Justice O'Connor's admonition in Williams that distinguished
between the words "unreasonable" and "incorrect." Somewhat surprisingly,
Justice O'Connor was also the author of Penry IT But again, regardless of
tension, it is clear that "error" plays an essential role in the establishment of
objective unreasonableness.
C. Summary andRecapitulation
With the text of§ 2254(d)(1) and the Court's initial interpretations of it as
a guide, there are a number of propositions that we can state with confidence.
However, there are a few key concepts that require further elucidation by the
Court. First, with respect to our confident predictions, we can safely conclude
that under § 2254(d)(1) a federal court may grant habeas on behalf of a person
in state custody raising a federal claim if and only if the following propositions
are satisfied:
*

the petitioner's claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court;

*

the claim is premised on a proposition of federal law clearly
established in the holdings of pre-existing Supreme Court
precedent;" 8

*

and one of the following propositions is true:
o the state court decision was premised on a rule of law
incompatible or logically inconsistent with that
precedent;
o the state court decision achieved a result opposite of that
precedent on materially indistinguishable facts; or
o the state court decision represents an objectively
unreasonable application of that precedent.

118. To the extent that Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), remains the model for this
principle, which it appears to do, those propositions of law must have been established as of the
date the petitioner's judgment of conviction became final. It is possible, and in my view,
constitutionally preferable, that the fundamental rights exceptions recognized by Teague would
also be exceptions to the "clearly established" principle of § 2254(d)(1 ), but the text itself does
not provide any such opening.
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(I am assuming that any perceived error is not harmless.) There are, however,
three points in this simple structure that require further judicial elucidation.
They are: (1) the scope of the "clearly established" principle; (2) the treatment
to be afforded the "materially indistinguishable" component of the contrary-to
standard; and (3) the definition of "objectively unreasonable."
The first two points requiring further judicial guidance are reasonably
lucid from a definitional perspective, but given the paucity of precedents we
will need a fuller judicial track record before we can say for certain how
broadly or narrowly these concepts will be applied. For example, while it
seems evident that the clearly-established principle is keyed to the holdings of
prior precedent, it remains unresolved as to whether and, if so, the extent to
which logical extensions of precedent will be permitted or circumscribed. The
trend appears to be toward circumscription, with Teague v. Lane lurking as the
background principle, but that may be a product of the Court majority's view of
the wisdom of allowing the particular doctrines at issue to spread roots, for
example, the somewhat technical parole ineligibility claim in Ramdass v.
Angelone, the narrow legal principle at issue in Bell v. Cone, and the factspecific Fifth Amendment claim in Penry v. Johnson. On the other hand, the
Court's ruling in Williams v. Taylor establishes the principle that courts can
deem rules of general applicability designed to cover a wide spectrum of factual
circumstances as clearly established within the context of subsection (d)(1).
The Court's definition of the contrary-to standard reflects the wellestablished and (relatively) noncontroversial principle of de novo and
independent federal review of questions of law. The biggest question lurking
behind this standard pertains to the phrase "materially indistinguishable." In a
sense, this question is quite similar to the questions surrounding the unresolved
scope of the clearly-established principle. A rigid application of the materiallyindistinguishable concept, that is, requiring a virtual identity of facts, will milk
it of its vitality because it should be quite rare that a state court will blunder
under such circumstances. Again, we will have to keep tuned in and remain
sensitive to the judicial perceptions surrounding the underlying right being
claimed.
The final point requiring judicial elucidation involves the "objectively
unreasonable" measure of the unreasonable-application standard. Although the
Court insists that objective unreasonableness is the critical measuring device of
this review standard, the Court has provided only minimal guidance as to the
meaning and scope of that phrase. Further work is required in this area.
From Williams v. Taylor, we know four things. First, the words
"unreasonable" and "incorrect" are not synonymous and the proper inquiry,
therefore, involves a determination of objective unreasonableness and not one
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solely premised on a perceived state court error. Second, a rational judicial
decision is not necessarily an objectively reasonable decision. In other words,
objective reasonableness requires something more than mere rationality. Third,
whether a state court's refusal to extend a clearly established federal law can
ever be deemed objectively unreasonable remains open, because the Williams

Court declined to answer that precise question. (Note the overlap between this
question and the unresolved questions surrounding the scope of the clearlyestablished principle and materially-indistinguishable component of the
contrary-to standard). Fourth, a state court's failure to apply a critical

component of a federal standard is objectively unreasonable, presumably
because a prudent, careful, and competent judge, having recognized the correct
standard, would apply each component of that standard.
The Court's decision in PenryII also provides some information about the
objectively-unreasonable measure. First, a state court's refusal to extend a factspecific Supreme Court precedent is not objectively unreasonable when the
precedent is readily distinguishable from the pending case, and this is especially
true when the Court perceives that precedent as narrowly limited to its specific
factual circumstances. This comes very close to saying that the state court
decision was correct, though the Supreme Court specifically declined to so rule
in Penry II. This tells us something, but not very much. Again, as per
Williams, whether refusal to extend precedent will ever be deemed objectively
unreasonable remains to be seen.
The only other point of knowledge to be gleaned from Penry II is more
enigmatic. The Court's conclusion that the state court failed to follow the
mandate ofPenry Irespecting jury instructions on mitigating evidence focused
entirely on whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was correct when it
ruled that the jury instructions in the second penalty phase were consistent with
Penry I. In other words, in approaching the question of objective
unreasonableness, the Penry II Court did precisely what it had admonished
lower federal courts against doing in Williams. It measured objective
unreasonableness by determining that the state court decision was incorrect. In
so doing, the Court seemed completely unaware of this inconsistency. Nor did
the Court suggest that the error was of a magnitude that objective
unreasonableness could be presumed. At the very least, the Court's approach
suggests that even if error is not the measure of objective unreasonableness, the
ascertainment of error plays some role in the determination of objective
unreasonableness. Precisely what that role is remains to be seen. One thing is
certain. The objectively unreasonable standard needs further and substantial
elaboration.
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IV. The October 2002 Term
In the October 2002 Term, the Supreme Court decided four cases
involving the application of § 2254(d)(1). Two of those decisions were
announced in per curiam opinions. Two were issued in full-dress opinions. In
this section, I examine each of those decisions in an effort to determine the
extent to which they either conform to the above model, alter that model, or add
to our understanding of it.
A. The Per Curiam Opinions
1. Woodford v. Visciotti
The underlying crime in Woodford v. Visciotti 19 involved an executionstyle murder, a related attempted execution-style murder, and an armed
robbery. Visciotti was convicted of all three crimes. After the penalty phase
of his trial, in which evidence of prior violent acts was introduced, including
the multiple stabbing of a pregnant woman, he was sentenced to death by the
same jury that had convicted him. After his conviction and sentence were
affirmed on direct appeal," 0 Visciotti filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
with the California Supreme Court. Among other things, he claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel stemming from his lawyer's substandard preparation for
and performance during the penalty phase. Specifically, Visciotti alleged that
counsel failed completely to investigate mitigating circumstances and failed to
present a coherent case in mitigation. The California Supreme Court appointed
a special master to hold a hearing on these allegations. After receiving the
master's report and after briefing on the merits, the California Supreme Court
denied the petition. It concluded that regardless of whether counsel's
performance was constitutionally inadequate, Visciotti had failed to establish
prejudice under the standards of Strickland v. Washington. 2 ,
Visciotti then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court.
The district court granted the petition and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 22 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that § 2254(d)(1) precluded habeas relief unless the
state court decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. It also appeared to adopt the Williams
119.
120.
121.
122.

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002).
People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 437 (Cal. 1992).
In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d 987, 1006 (Cal. 1996).
Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
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interpretation of those standards. Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, a
decision is "contrary to federal law if it 'fail[s] to apply the correct controlling
authority from the Supreme Court."" 23 As to the unreasonable-application
standard, if a state court correctly identifies the controlling precedent, it can be
reversed only if its application of the law to the facts is "objectively
unreasonable."'124 Purporting to apply these standards, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the California Supreme Court's decision was both contrary to
and an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington. The Ninth
Circuit cited three grounds for its ruling: (1) the California Supreme Court
applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether the petitioner had
established prejudice; (2) the California Supreme Court failed to assess the
totality of the mitigating evidence in applying the Strickland prejudice
standards; and (3) the California Supreme Court unreasonably concluded that
the evidence of aggravating circumstances was overwhelming.
The key issue before the Ninth Circuit pertained to the standard of proof
necessary to establish prejudice. Strickland imposes a reasonable probability
standard. 2 ' The Ninth Circuit concluded that the California Supreme Court
applied a stricter preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 2 6 Hence, in the
Ninth Circuit's view, the state court's decision failed to apply the correct
controlling authority and was contrary to clearly established federal law.
The California Supreme Court described the standard it intended to apply
as follows: "The question we must answer is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors and omissions, the sentencing
authority, would have found that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
factors did not warrant imposition of the death penalty. '27 The court also
quoted from Strickland at length and, borrowing language from Strickland,
described the inquiry into reasonable probability as focused on whether
counsel's performance had "undermined confidence in the outcome.' 28 The
reasonable-probability language was used three times in describing the
Strickland standard. 29 Yet, after examining and weighing the evidence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the California court stated, "It is not
probablethat had this evidence been presented a more favorable result would
123. Id. at 1104 (quoting Shackleford v.Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000)).
124. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).
125. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
126. Visciotti, 288 F.3d at 1108-09.
127. In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d 987, 1003 (Cal. 1996) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 1004; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
129. Id. at 1003-04.
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have resulted at the penalty phase."130 This formula was repeated twice in the
text. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the failure to use the modifier
"reasonably" indicated a failure to apply the correct standard. 13' In so ruling, the
Ninth Circuit made no reference to the California Supreme Court's previous
use of the modifier in describing the standard. Nor did it reference the
California Supreme Court's extensive discussion of the Strickland standard.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the California Supreme Court had
applied an erroneous preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard, even though the
32
state court never used that phrase.
The United States Supreme Court described the Ninth Circuit's ruling as
"a mischaracterization of the state court opinion.' 33 The high court was
confident that the California Supreme Court had applied the correct standard,
given that the state court used the modifier "reasonable" in describing the
standard and given that the state court properly identified "undermin[ing]
confidence in the outcome" as the proper measure of that standard. 34 Hence,
the decision of that court was not contrary to clearly established law as
embodied in Supreme Court precedent. As to the unmodified use of the word
"probable," the Court observed:
The California Supreme Court's opinion painstakingly describes the
Strickland standard. Its occasional shorthand reference to that standard by
use of the term "probable" without the modifier may perhaps be imprecise,
but if so it can no more be considered a repudiation of the standard than can
this Court's own occasional indulgence in the same imprecision. '35
As for the Ninth Circuit,
The Court of Appeals made no effort to reconcile the state court's use of
term "probable" with its use, elsewhere, of Strickland's term "reasonably
probable," nor did it even acknowledge, much less discuss, the California
Supreme Court's proper framing of the question as whether the evidence
"undermines confidence" in the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.
This readiness to attribute error is inconsistent
with the presumption that
136
state courts know and follow the law.

130. Id. at 1005 (emphasis added).
131. Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1109 & n. II(9th Cir. 2002).
132.
133.

Id. at 1108-09.
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22 (2002).

134.
135.

Id.

136.

Id. at 24.

Id.
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In short, the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the California Supreme Court had
applied the wrong law was belied by the content of the state court's opinion.
The Ninth Circuit also held that even had the California Supreme Court
applied the correct standard, its application of that standard was objectively

unreasonable because the state court failed to consider the totality of the

mitigating evidence and because, contrary to the state court's conclusion, the
aggravating factors were not overwhelming.' 37 On the first point, the Supreme
Court again disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's characterization of the
California Supreme Court opinion. "All of the mitigating evidence, and all of
counsel's prejudicial actions, that the Ninth Circuit specifically referred to as
having been left out of account or consideration were in fact described in the
California Supreme Court's lengthy and careful opinion."' 138 The Court went
on to detail the California Supreme Court's discussion and integration of these
factors. 139 Hence, in the Court's view, the Ninth Circuit failed to establish that
the state court's application of the "totality" prong of Stricklandwas objectively
unreasonable. Inessence, the United States Supreme Court was confident that
the state supreme court had considered the totality of the mitigating evidence.
On the question of whether the California Supreme Court was "objectively
unreasonable" in concluding that the aggravating circumstances were
"overwhelming," hence negating the reasonable probability of prejudice, the
Ninth Circuit said, "The record reflects, however, that the aggravating factors
were not overwhelming, as the jury deliberated a full day and then requested
additional guidance on the definitions of 'moral justification' and 'extreme
duress." 40 This is certainly a reasonable observation, but nowhere does the
Ninth Circuit explain why the contrary view of the state court, premised on the
nature of the crime and the evidence of other crimes of violence, was
objectively unreasonable. Rather, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be saying no
more than that it disagreed with the decision of the state court. As the United
States Supreme Court correctly noted, the Ninth Circuit, applying the
lacked authority to substitute its judgment
unreasonable-application standard,
4
for that of the state court.' '
The Supreme Court's decision in Woodford v. Visciotti breaks no new
ground, but it does provide a few lessons for attorneys and judges. Two of the
errors committed by the Ninth Circuit involved that court's mischaracterization
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002).
Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.
Id.at 25-26.
Visciotti, 288 F.3d at 1118.
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27 (2002).
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of the California Supreme Court's decision. One can generously characterize
the first error, pertaining to the reasonable probability standard, as involving the
Ninth Circuit's incomplete and selective reading of the state court opinion. The
second error, pertaining to whether the state court considered the totality of the
mitigating evidence, suffered from the same type of flaws, though it was
probably not as egregious. The Supreme Court's reaction to the Ninth Circuit's
judgment on these particular points can be seen as reflective of an attitude of
deference the Court perceives to be embodied in the text of § 2254(d), an
interpretive skin the Court has placed on the text. As the Court put it, "This
readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts
know and follow the law."'142 In other words, before arriving at such
conclusions, a federal court must fully and fairly examine the text of a decision
that it has been asked to reverse. The third error, pertaining to the
"overwhelming" nature of the aggravating circumstances, reveals a failure by
the Ninth Circuit to follow Justice O'Connor's admonition in Williams that
§ 2254(d)(1) requires the resolution of a particular question, namely, whether
the state court decision was objectively unreasonable. The Ninth Circuit cited
but never examined that question. In this sense, the Ninth Circuit misperceived
its function. Instead of asking whether the state court decision was objectively
unreasonable, it asked whether that decision was correct and having concluded
that it was not correct, labeled it objectively unreasonable. The lesson here is
that a federal court must begin with the right question and arrive at its judgment
based on an examination
of the criteria that might measure objective
43
reasonableness. 1

142. Id.at 24.
143. A third lesson can be gleaned from Visciotti. To determine whether a reasonable
probability of prejudice had been established, the California Supreme Court was required to
consider the totality of the evidence in mitigation, weigh that evidence against the evidence in
aggravation, and then make ajudgment about what thejury's response would have been had it
seen all the evidence. In some cases, the resolution of the reasonable probability question may
be clear, either because the evidence on one side or the other is such that no rational person
could disagree, or because binding precedent on materially indistinguishable facts provides an
obvious answer. But this was not such a case. The type of mitigating evidence that would have
been discovered had counsel done a thorough investigation was, although considerable, of a
type that is often presented during penalty phases and which sometimes makes a difference and
sometimes does not. Hence, the critical questions for the California Supreme Court were, first,
how this relatively standard, albeit not inconsequential, mitigating evidence stacked up against
the aggravating evidence and, second, whether it was reasonably probable that had this
mitigating evidence been introduced the jurors would not have voted for the death penalty.
There is one and only one correct answer to this question. Either it is reasonably probable or it
isnot. Unfortunately, given the limits of human capability and the underdeterminate nature of
the legal standard, particularly on facts that do not point in any obvious direction, it isvirtually
impossible to pinpoint that answer with anything like certainty. As I stated earlier,
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2. Early v. Packer
The defendant in Early v. Packer'4 was convicted in a California state
court of second-degree murder and attempted murder. His convictions were
affirmed by the state court of appeal. Among other things, the Court of Appeal
rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court coerced the jury to reach a
verdict and therefore "denied him his due process right to a fair and impartial
jury. " 145 Defendant's argument centered on comments made by the judge to
one juror, as well as on events surrounding those comments. The juror had
asked to be excused after twenty-eight hours of deliberations. When she agreed
that she could "hold out just a little bit longer," the judge replied to her: "I
really appreciate it. Otherwise, they have to start deliberations all over again
with another person."'' 46 In ruling against the defendant, the appellate court
relied exclusively on California precedent. The California Supreme Court
denied discretionary review. The defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court. The district court denied the writ but issued a certificate
of appealability on the coercion issue. The Ninth Circuit, concluding that the
judge's comments were unconstitutionally
coercive, reversed and ordered the
47
district court to grant the writ.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the state court decision was contrary to clearly
established federal law, namely, the Supreme Court's decisions in Jenkins v.
United States148 and Lowenfield v. Phelps.149 Those cases, according to the

Here, within this very narrow range of fined-tuned judgments that apply
underdeterminate laws, the unreasonableness standard may require a federal judge
to defer to a state court decision with which she disagrees but as to which she
cannot state with certainty that the state court was objectively wrong. This is not to
say that the state court decision is wrong-but-reasonable, but that given the
underdeterminate nature of the applicable legal principle and the fact-specific
nature of the particular problem, the decision must be upheld because it isat least
objectively reasonable and not clearly wrong.
Supra page 691. Applying this principle here, neither possible conclusion as to whether a
reasonable probability had been established can be described as certainly or definitively correct.
In short, this aspect of Viscioti represents a case in which the ideal of definitive legal solutions
is met with the practical reality of objectively reasonable alternatives under underdeterminate
standards of law, either of which could be correct.
144. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002).
145.
146.

ld. at 6.
Id. at4.

147. Packer v. Hill, 291 F.3d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 2002).
148. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
149. Lowenfield v.Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
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Ninth Circuit, created a "working constitutional standard" through which to
evaluate the petitioner's claim.'50 Under that standard,
Coercive statements from the judge to the jury result in a denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury .... In order to
determine whether the judge's comments were impermissibly coercive, the
court must evaluate
them "in [their] context and under all the
5
circumstances."'

In the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, the California Court of Appeal
decision was contrary to federal law because the state court failed to apply the
totality of the circumstances test:
[Instead that court] simply mentioned three particular incidents in its
analysis and considered each of them separately .... The California Court
of Appeal failed to consider the cumulative impact of these three incidents,
as well as the cumulative effect
52 of several other coercive judicial actions
and statements in this case.
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the state Court of Appeal's opinion
"failed to cite any federal law, much less the controlling Supreme Court
precedents."' 153 Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that the state court's decision
"made an explicit statement of law that is contrary to Supreme Court
precedent." As to this point, the state court had observed that a statement is
only coercive if it coerces "a particular type of verdict." Under Supreme Court
a judge's comments can be
precedent, as explained by the Ninth Circuit,
54
deemed coercive if they "coerced a verdict."1
The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous per curiam opinion. The
Court gave three reasons for its reversal of the Ninth Circuit. As to the first, the
Court held that the state court's failure to cite the controlling Supreme Court
precedent was not fatal. According to the Court, the contrary-to standard "does
not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor
the result of the state-court decision contradicts them."' 5 This observation is
surely correct because, as noted previously, if the application of an incorrect
standard nonetheless leads to a correct outcome (the third combination), then
the state court decision is not incompatible with the applicable federal law.
Moreover, if the state-imposed standards are either equally or more restrictive
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Packer, 291 F.3d at 578.
Id.
Id, at 578-79 & n.10.
Id. at578.
Id. at 579.
Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).
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of state power than federal precedent, the state standards can hardly be
described as incompatible with federal law. In fairness to the Ninth Circuit,
however, the "failure to cite any federal law" statement in its opinion appears to
be more of an introductory observation than a basis for that court's holding.
Next, the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's judgment that the state
court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances. Because the state
appellate court described all the circumstances surrounding the coercion claim,
"[t]he contention that the California court 'failed to consider' facts and
circumstances that it had taken the trouble to recite strains credulity."'5 6 Nor
did the Court agree with the Ninth Circuit that the state court failed to consider
the "cumulative impact" of the various events. "Compliance with Lowenfield
does not demand a formulary statement that the trial court's actions and
inactions were noncoercive 'individually and cumulatively.' It suffices that that
was the fair import of the Court of Appeal's opinion."' 157 In short, in the view
of a unanimous Supreme Court, the state court did apply the totality of the
circumstances test as mandated by the Court's precedents. That being the case,
the state court's decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law.
Of course, whether one agrees with the Court on this point depends on
how one reads the California Court of Appeal's decision. The slightly over
three-page section of that opinion that addresses the coercion issue details all
the pertinent facts, save one pertaining to a shift from the 10-2 vote to the 11-I
vote, focuses most of its analytical attention on the statements made to the
reluctant juror, and then concludes, "Accordingly, the comments made and not
made by the court to the jury did not coerce a particular verdict or deny Packer
any constitutional rights."' 58 The statement made to the juror was undoubtedly
the key component of the coercion claim. Moreover, given that the generally
thorough statement of facts preceded the appellate court's conclusion regarding
the coercive nature of the trial court's "comments," it seems reasonable to
conclude that the "fair import" of the Court of Appeal's opinion is that it
considered the totality of the circumstances. Undoubtedly, reasonable minds
could differ, but as the Court observed in Woodford v. Visciotti, "This readiness
to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and
follow the law."'5 9
The third point of reversal involved the distinction between the "coerced
any verdict" and the "coerced a verdict" standards. On this issue, the Supreme
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 9.
Id.
Pet. for Cert., App. H at 16, Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (No. 02-137).
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

HABEAS STANDARDS OFREVIEW
Court explained that the federal standard did not state a constitutional principle,
but was derived solely from the Court's supervisory powers over federal
courts. 60 Hence, the standard did not bind state courts. As a consequence, the
state court's decision in this regard was not contrary to binding Supreme Court
precedent.
The primary lesson to be gleaned from Early v. Packer is that a state
court's failure to follow Supreme Court precedent is not to be presumed.
Neither the failure to cite the applicable precedent nor the failure to write an
opinion that conforms to a precise federal formula is sufficient to establish that
a state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law.
B. Lockyer v. Andrade
Lockyer v. Andrade 6' involved a challenge to an application of
California's three strikes law. The primary issue before the Court was whether
the Ninth Circuit, in ordering a district court to grant habeas, had properly
applied the unreasonable-application principle. By a five to four vote, the
Court held that it had not. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court
and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.
Justice Souter wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer.
1. Facts, Proceedings,and BackgroundLegal Principles
The facts of Lockyer v. Andrade can be simply stated.' 62 Leandro
Andrade was charged with two counts of petty theft for stealing videotapes
from two different Kmarts. The total value of the merchandise stolen was
approximately $150. The prosecutor, in an exercise of discretion, chose to
prosecute these misdemeanor/felony "wobblers" as felonies. The jury
convicted Andrade on both counts and also found that he had been previously
convicted of three counts of residential burglary.6 3 All of Andrade's
convictions were for nonviolent offenses. Nonetheless, each of the felony petty
160. Early, 537 U.S. at 9-10.
161. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003).
162. Id. at 1169-70; id. at 1176-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163. Andrade had also been twice convicted of misdemeanor petty theft, once convicted of
escape from prison, and on two separate occasions convicted in federal court of transporting
marijuana. Id. at 1170. These prior crimes did not operate as predicate offenses for the purpose
of the three strikes law.
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theft convictions qualified as a third strike under California law based on the
three previous residential burglary convictions. Pursuant to that law, the trial
court sentenced Andrade to twenty-five years to life on each count, to be served
consecutively. Under this sentence, Andrade would be eligible for parole after
fifty years, that is, at age eighty-seven.
Andrade challenged his sentence under the proportionality principle
embodied in the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because the substance
of his claim is intertwined with the questions presented under § 2254(d)(1),
some background on the Court's proportionality precedents is necessary. There
are three key decisions: Rummel v. Estelle,'4 Solem v. Helm,'165 and Harmelin
v. Michigan.166
In Rummel v. Estelle, the defendant was sentenced to a mandatory life
term as a recidivist after his third felony conviction. His three convictions were
all relatively minor-fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of
goods and services, passing a $28.36 fraudulent check, and obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses. Nonetheless, by a 5-4 majority, the Rummel Court held that
the defendant's life sentence, which carried the possibility of parole in twelve
years, was not grossly disproportionate to his crime. 167 Essentially, the Court
adopted a circumscribed view of proportionality, observing that, "Outside the
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of
particular sentences have been exceedingly rare."1 68 The obvious point of the
Rummel majority was to continue that tradition. Justice Powell wrote the fourperson dissent.
Solem v. Helm, was decided three years later. In that case, the defendant
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under a
South Dakota recidivism statute. The triggering offense for Solem's sentence
was uttering a "no account" check for $100. Solem had six prior convictions,
all nonviolent: three for third-degree burglary, and one each for obtaining
money under false pretenses, grand larceny, and "third-offense" driving while
intoxicated.'69 The Court, again by a 5-4 majority, this time in an opinion by
Justice Powell, held that Solem's sentence was disproportionate to his crime
and, hence, violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 268-85.
id. at 272.
Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-80.
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unusual punishment. 170 In so ruling, the Solem Court described and applied
what it deemed the "objective" criteria for measuring proportionality:
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment
should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."'
The Solem Court distinguished Rummel based on the relative harshness of
the life-without-parole sentence imposed in Solem. "This sentence is far more
severe than the life sentence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was
likely to have been eligible for parole within twelve years of his initial
confinement, a fact on which the Court relied heavily."'' 7 The dissent was
written by Justice Rehnquist, the author of Rummel.
Finally, in Harmelin v. Michigan, the defendant was sentenced to a
mandatory term of life without the possibility of parole for possession of 650
grams of cocaine. Justice Scalia, writing for himself and the Chief Justice,
announced the judgment of the Court affirming the sentence and argued that
Solem should be overruled. In so doing, he described that case as being
"scarcely the expression of clear and well accepted constitutional law."' 173 A
concurring opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, also worried about the clarity of the standards, but
endorsed the proportionality principle and the decision in Solem. Applying the
Solem gravity-of-the-offense and harshness-of-the-sentence factor, the opinion
concluded that the sentence imposed was not disproportionate to what the
plurality perceived as a very serious crime. 174 This conclusion alone was
enough to dispose of Harmelin's claim since the plurality also concluded that
the second and third Solem factors, that is, the comparative factors, need be
applied only if a "comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.' 175 In short, the seriousness of
the drug offense obviated the necessity of examining the second and third
factors. The three-person dissent, authored by Justice White, joined by Justices

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Justice Blackmun provided the "swing votes" in Rummel and Solem.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
Id. at 297.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
Id. at 1003-04.
Id. at 1005.
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Blackmun and Stevens, and essentially concurred in by Justice Marshall,
applied all three Solem factors and found the sentence to be disproportionate. 76
Returning to the proceedings in Andrade, on direct appeal, the California
Court of Appeal rejected Andrade's proportionality argument. As to the federal
proportionality standards, the Court of Appeal began by observing:
[T]o the extent defendant suggests that the proportionality analysis applies
under both the state and federal constitutions, we must question that
assertion. As Division One of this court noted recently... the current
validity of the Solem proportionality
analysis is questionable in light of
177
Harmelin v. Michigan.
The appellate court, therefore, ignored Solem/Harmelin completely and
instead compared the crimes committed by Andrade solely with those
committed by the defendant of Rummel. Given the rough similarity of the
offenses, the court concluded, "Comparing defendant's crimes and criminal
history with that of defendant Rummel, we cannot say the sentence of fifty
years to life at issue in this case is disproportionate and constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment under the United States Constitution."17 The comparison
with Rummel did not mention that Rummel would have been parole eligible in
twelve years, while Andrade's parole eligibility was set at fifty years. The court
similarly found that Andrade's sentence did not violate the state's constitution.
2. The Ninth Circuit Opinion
Andrade then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court raising an Eighth Amendment proportionality claim. The district court
denied the petition. The Ninth Circuit reversed. 7 9 Judge Richard Paez, writing
for a split panel, began his opinion for the court by citing the § 2254(d)(1)
federal review standards and by recognizing Williams v. Taylor as the
controlling authority as to the scope of these standards.' 80 Although Judge Paez
noted that the contrary-to and unreasonable-application standards sometimes
176. Id. at 1009-27; id. at 1027.
177. Pet. for Cert., App. E at 76, Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003) (No. 011127) (citation omitted). The "assertion" being questioned was whether the U.S. Constitution
imposed a proportionality requirement. The California Court of Appeal expressly recognized
that an apparently less stringent version of proportionality was available under the state
constitution. Id. at 77.
178. Id. at 77.
179. Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 753 (9th Cir. 2001).
180. Id.
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overlap, he implicitly assumed that Andrade's challenge to the California Court
of Appeal decision involved only the latter. Having made this assumption, he
described the proper structure of a federal court's analysis under § 2254(d)(1)
as follows: First, the federal court must identify the clearly established
principle of federal law. Next, if and only if such a principle has been
identified, the federal court must determine whether the state court erred in
applying that principle. Finally, if and only if an error of application has been
found, the federal court must determine whether that error was unreasonable.
An application will be deemed unreasonable "only when our independent
review of the legal question 'leaves us with a "firm conviction" that one
answer, the one rejected by the [state] court, was correct and the other, the
application of the federal law that the [state] court adopted, was erroneous-in
other words that clear error occurred." '"181
Proceeding to the first step in the analysis, Judge Paez identified the
clearly established principle of federal law as one prohibiting "gross
disproportionality" in sentencing, as measured by the objective criteria
described in Solem v. Helm and as modified in Harmelin v. Michigan. More
generally, he relied on principles extracted from Rummel v. Estelle, Solem, and
Harmelin.112 He described these cases in some detail, noting the salient factual
and legal differences between and among them. In concluding his survey of
Supreme Court proportionality precedent, he explained that Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Harmelinstates the rule of that case due to the congruence between
Kennedy's three-person concurrence and the four-person dissent. Moreover,
while the Harmelin "rule" modifies the Solem three-factor test by treating the
gravity-of-the-offense factor as a threshold requirement, Justice Kennedy's
opinion "did not suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that his analysis would have
led to a different outcome in Solem." 83 In short, the clearly-established
principle of federal law is the law that emerges from this trio of precedents, and
the decision in Solem remains an integral part of that law.
Having identified the clearly established principle, Judge Paez applied that
principle to determine if the state court committed error.'" He began, as
Harmelin requires, by comparing the harshness of the penalty with the gravity
of the offense. As a factual matter, Andrade's sentence was a term of fifty
years to life, with no reduction for good behavior or for working while in

181.
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183.
184.

Id. (quoting Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 753-58.
Id. at 758.
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prison, and no parole eligibility until the expiration of fifty years.' Judge Paez
then noted that this sentence was "substantially more severe than the life
sentence at issue in Rummel," 8 6 where the defendant would be parole eligible
in twelve years. By way of contrast, Andrade's sentence "is the functional
equivalent of the sentences at issue in Solem and Harmelin-life in prison
without the possibility of parole."'8 7 Given that "the life expectancy of a 37year-old American male is 77 years... [i]t is more likely than not that Andrade
will spend the remainder of his life in prison without ever becoming eligible for
parole."188 In short, Andrade's sentence is harsh, the functional equivalent of
the second most severe sentence possible, namely, life without the possibility of
parole.
Harshness alone, however, does not establish disproportionality. The next
offense."' 8 9
step is to "examine the punishment in light of the gravity of the
Here Judge Paez concluded that Solem provides the closest analogy:
Even if we consider Andrade's entire criminal history record-five
felonies, two misdemeanors, and one parole violation-it is still
comparable, quantitatively and qualitatively, to that of the defendant in
Solem. Both defendants had three burglary convictions, although only
Andrade was convicted of all three in a single proceeding. All of the
offenses were non-violent. Given that Andrade's sentence of 50 years to
life is a sentence of life without a realistic possibility of parole, his case is
most analogous to Solem.19°
In short, given the harshness of the sentence as compared to the gravity of the
crimes, and measuring these factors against the precedents, Judge Paez
concluded that an inference of gross disproportionality had been established.
Judge Paez completed the disproportionality inquiry by undertaking the
intra- and inter-jurisdictional sentencing comparisons required by Solem and
Harmelin. The inference of gross disproportionality was supported by both
comparisons. As to the first, Judge Paez explained that Andrade's sentence
was longer than sentences available for most violent crimes committed within
the State of California and was twice as long as the comparable three-strikes
sentences submitted for comparative reference by the state.'"' With respect to
the inter-jurisdictional comparison, Judge Paez performed a detailed survey of
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 758.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Id.

189. Id.
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other states with comparable recidivist statutes and concluded that Andrade
"could not have received such a severe sentence anywhere else in the United
States, with the possible exception of Louisiana."' 9'
Having applied the objective measures of gross disproportionality, Judge
Paez concluded, "we disagree with the California Court of Appeal and
conclude that Andrade's sentence is so grossly disproportionate to his crime
193
that it violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Given this disagreement, the question then became whether the decision of the
state court involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law, that is, whether the state court committed clear error:
A proper analysis of gross disproportionality requires a comparison to all
three cases: Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin. While Andrade's crimes and
history are comparable to those of the defendants in both Rummel and
Solem, his life sentence with no possibility of parole for fifty years is most
analogous to Solem. The state court's failure to address Solem yields an
unreasonable conclusion that a non-violent recidivist sentenced to such a
severe sentence for two misdemeanor offenses does not raise an inference
of gross disproportionality. Its conclusion that Andrade's sentence does not
violate the Eighth Amendment is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's
decision in Solem and thus constitutes clear error.'94
The standards of § 2254(d)(1) having been satisfied, the judgment of the
district court denying habeas relief was reversed. The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the Ninth Circuit had properly applied the unreasonableapplication standard of § 2254(d)(1).
3. The Opinion of the Court
a. The Clearly EstablishedPrinciple
The first question for the Andrade Court was whether Andrade's
proportionality claim was premised on "clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."' 9 Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court begins this inquiry by quoting her Williams majority
opinion ("refers to holdings, as opposed to the dicta"), but then veers into
entirely new territory. Instead of distilling the holdings from the relevant
192.
193.

ld. at 766.
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precedents, she appears bent on undermining those precedents. In her words,
"Our precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity."'' 96 For this
proposition, she cites to the opinions written by Justices Scalia and Kennedy in
Harmelin. Of course, Justice Scalia was writing a polemic against Solem and
the proportionality principle as part of his two-person concurrence. Justice
Kennedy's rather mild observations-"its precise contours are unclear"-were
written from the perspective of one trying to bring more precision to the
analysis, not less.' 97
From the foregoing data, and without any effort to examine the elements
of the doctrine of gross disproportionality, including the relationships between
or among the relevant cases, Justice O'Connor simply concludes, "Thus, in this
case, the only relevant clearly established law amenable to the 'contrary to' or
'unreasonable application of' framework is the gross disproportionality
principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the
'exceedingly rare' and 'extreme' case. " 19' For the last two internal quotes
("exceedingly rare" and "extreme") she relies on dicta extracted from the cases
in which she might have discovered actual holdings. Hence, the clearlyestablished principle that emerges from O'Connor's analysis is simply a
recognition of an amorphous principle of gross disproportionality, the potential
range of which is all but indiscernible.
Justice O'Connor's approach to the clearly-established principle here
contrasts with. the approach she and Justice Stevens adopted in Williams v.
Taylor. Williams claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The Court had no difficulty recognizing that the rule Williams sought to
enforce was clearly established by the Court's decision in Strickland v.
Washington. This was true despite the fact that application of Stricklandwould
require a case-by-case analysis of whether counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and, if so, whether it was reasonably
probable that counsel's deficient performance adversely affected the result.
One could say that the "precise contours" of these principles are unclear.
Certainly, reasonable minds might well differ as to their application in
particular cases. Yet the Williams Court had no difficultly identifying this
clearly-established principle of federal law and then applying it as a measure of
the state court's decision.'" The three objective factors described in Solem
196.
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appear to be of the very same ilk as the two-part Stricklandtest. Indeed, both
Strickland and Solem create underdeterminate multifactored tests to measure
the underlying constitutional claim. Moreover, one can sensibly argue that
Solem's objective standards are less underdetermined than the relatively openended questions asked under Strickland.
The approach adopted by Justice O'Connor in Andrade is also at odds
with the text of§ 2254(d)(1). The text does not call for a rule that is both clear
and established. It calls for a rule, the establishment of which is undisputed,
that is, clearly established, under an accepted rule of recognition. 00 In the
specific context of § 2254(d)(1), the only recognized rule of law is Supreme
Court precedent. As such, Justice O'Connor's "holdings, as opposed to the
dicta" principle from Williams provides the proper guidance. Consistent with
that principle, a court searching for clearly established law within the meaning
of § 2254(d)(1) must identify the law that emerges from the holdings of the
relevant precedent. A conceptual discourse on the clarity of the law has little
relevance to this inquiry.
Suppose Justice O'Connor had actually applied her Williams principle.
Presumably, she would have attended to the three critical cases, Rummel,
Solem, and Harmelin, in an effort to determine the established law that emerges
from the respective holdings in each case. Because Andrade placed principal
reliance on Solem, the critical question would have been whether Solem
survived the Court's judgment in Harmelin. It certainly seems to have done so.
A seven-person majority of the Justices in Harmelin rejected Justice Scalia's
call to overrule Solem. Four of those Justices voted to reaffirm Solem in its
entirety.' ° ' Three Justices voted to reaffirm Solem, but concluded that the first
objective factor--comparing the gravity of the offense with the harshness of the
punishment-should be treated as a key threshold issue.20 2 By way of contrast,
only two Justices voted to overrule Solem.2 °3
Any reasonable reading of this trio of proportionality decisions, that is, a
reading undertaken by any prudent, careful, and competent jurist, makes two
things abundantly clear. First, the Harmelinjudgment did not overrule Solem,
but reaffirmed it. Second, to the extent that the Harmelinjudgment modified
Solem, it did so in the manner endorsed in Justice Kennedy's concurring
claim).
200. See supra Part IL.A.l (discussing the meaning of the phrase "clearly established
federal law").
201. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Stevens,
JJ.); id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor & Souter, JJ.).
203. Id. at 962 (Scalia, J., joined by the Chief Justice).
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opinion, which, rather than confusing the problem, clarified the manner in
which the Solem objective factors were to be applied. 0 4 I arrive at this
conclusion with some confidence because on the very day that the Court
decided Lockyer v. Andrade, it reaffirmed the Solem/Harmelin principles in
Ewing v. California.05 Ewing involved the direct review of a proportionality
challenge to a three-strikes sentence. Hence, the Court's opinion in that case is
unclouded by concerns regarding the federal review standards of§ 2254(d)(1).
The opinion announcing the judgment of the Ewing Court, which was
written by Justice O'Connor and joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Kennedy, describes the Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin proportionality
precedents with confident clarity and in a manner that neatly parallels the above
distillation of the underlying doctrine.20 6 Justice O'Connor concludes in Ewing,
"The proportionality principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence [in Harmelin] guide our application of the Eighth
Amendment ....207 Later in her opinion, she applies this proportionality
principle by comparing the severity of the crimes committed by the defendant
in Ewing with the harshness of the sentence imposed.20 8 The four-person
dissent in Ewing, although arriving at a different result, also adopts Justice
Kennedy's Harmelin concurrence as its model of proportionality review.2 9 In
short, on the same day Andrade announced the lack of clarity in the doctrine of
gross disproportionality for purposes of § 2254(d)(1), a seven-person majority
of the Court in Ewing reaffirmed the specific and reasonably discernible
contours of that same doctrine.
The approach to the clearly-established principle adopted by the Andrade
majority is both difficult to understand and impossible to justify other than on
purely instrumentalist grounds. It is difficult to understand in part because the
approach adopted is inconsistent with the text of § 2254(d)(1) and with the
Williams interpretation of that text, and in part because the "lack of clarity"
conclusion is so plainly at odds with the Court's own perception of the
controlling principles of law. It is impossible to justify, because by describing a
204. This view of the "holding" in Harmelin is standard. See, e.g., Henderson v. Norris,
258 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 200 1) (following Justice Kennedy's concurrence); Henry v. Page,
223 F.3d 477, 482 (7th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th
Cir. 2000) (same).
205. Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003).
206. Id. at H85-87 (O'Connor, I., announcing the judgment of the Court,joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Kennedy, J.).
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209.
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clearly-established principle at its most abstract level, the Court essentially
eviscerates the federal review standards. It will be rare indeed that a state-court
decision will be either contrary to or involve an unreasonable application of
amorphously described federal law. In neither Williams nor any other previous
case did the Court resort to this sleight of hand. One hopes then that this aspect
of Andrade is an aberration and not a standard-setting decision. It may not
even be binding on future proportionality cases, given the Court's
contemporaneous and contradictory decision in Ewing.
b. Contrary To
The Ninth Circuit did not address the contrary-to standard. The Supreme
Court, nonetheless, discussed and applied that standard. The Court's
discussion begins with a reiteration of the Williams definition of the contrary-to
principle. Under that definition, a state court decision is contrary to clearly
established federal law if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in our cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of
facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.02 0 " Applying the
first component of this definition, Justice O'Connor explains:
In terms of length of sentence and availability of parole, severity of the
underlying offense, and the impact of recidivism, Andrade's sentence
implicates factors relevant in both Rummel and Solem. Because Harmelin
and Solem specifically stated that they did not overrule Rummel, it was not
contrary to our clearly established law for the California Court of Appeal to
turn to Rummel in deciding whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate.
Indeed, Harmelin allows a state court to reasonably rely on Rummel in
determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate. The California
Court of Appeal's decision was therefore not "contrary to" the governing
legal principles set forth in our cases.21'
The foregoing statement represents the Court's complete discussion and
application of the first component of the contrary-to principle. One almost feels
rude in pointing out that the Court answered the wrong question. The question
was not whether the California Court of Appeal could rely on Rummel-it
surely could-but whether it could ignore Solem/Harmelin, which it surely
could not. Thus, while reliance on Rummel would not "contradict the
governing law set forth" in the Court's cases, refusing to apply Solem, the case
210.
211.
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that established the objective measures of proportionality, seems to involve
precisely such a contradiction. This contradiction is made all the more apparent
by the California Court of Appeal's assertions that proportionality review may
no longer be available under the federal constitution, and that "the current
validity of the Solem proportionality analysis is questionable in light of
Harmelin v. Michigan."21 2 Even if this latter assertion were true, the Court of
Appeal would at least have been required to apply Harmelin. Instead, that
court applied Rummel and no other case. One can fairly infer, therefore, that
the California Court of Appeal mistakenly thought that Rummel set the
exclusive measure of the federal proportionality standard, that is, to the extent
there was any such standard. This view was incompatible with the principles of
federal law clearly established in Solem and Harmelin.
As noted, the Ninth Circuit did not apply the contrary-to principle. This
was, in my estimation, a major oversight, but the Ninth Circuit's default cannot
excuse the Supreme Court's woefully incomplete analysis of this issue. For
one thing, the Court chose to address the issue. Having done so, at the very
least it could have asked the right question. For another thing, Andrade's
counsel raised and discussed this point at length in the Respondent's Brief on
the Merits. 213 The Court, therefore, was quite aware of the problem and its
scope.
As matters now rest, one could argue that Andrade stands for the
proposition that the failure to apply a plainly applicable standard of federal law
is not contrary to that standard even if the default leads to an incorrect outcome.
To put it mildly, this must be wrong. If the standard requires a particular
analysis and/or the consideration of a specific precedent, the failure to
undertake that analysis or to apply that precedent is "incompatible" with the
standard. Or to use Justice O'Connor's language from Williams, such a default
is "diametrically different" from or "opposite in character or nature" or
"mutually opposed" to the clearly-established standard. 4 The most sensible
position to take, given the Court's failure to ask the correct question, is that the
Court's truncated application of this aspect of the contrary-to standard sets no
new principles and simply represents an incomplete analysis of the question
presented.
The second component of the definition of "contrary-to" involves those
state court decisions that confront a case materially indistinguishable from a
212. Pet. for Cert., App. E at 76, People v. Andrade, 101 Cal. App. 4th 351 (Cal. App.
2002) (No. EO18257).
213. Respondent's Brief at 33-37, Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 270 F. 3d. 743 (9th
Cir. 2001) (No. 99-5569 1).
214. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000).

HABEAS STANDARDS OFREVIEW

Supreme Court precedent, but that arrive at a conclusion opposite to that
precedent. Given that the standards for measuring proportionality are keyed to
an assessment of the harshness of the offense as weighed against the gravity of
the crime, it would seem that a material distinction in this context would be one
that pertained to either of these factors and that differed in some significant way
from the sentence or crime in the controlling precedent. Thus, a sentence that
was significantly less harsh than the sentence imposed in the precedent would
constitute a material distinction. To state an obvious example, life without the
possibility of parole is significantly less harsh than the death penalty. A similar
analysis could be performed on the relative gravity of the crimes.
In a brief and almost cryptic paragraph, Justice O'Connor announces that
Andrade's case is materially distinguishable from Solem. Her sole justification
for this conclusion is that Solem received a life sentence without the possibility
of parole while "Andrade retains the possibility of parole. 2' 5 On its face, this
seems plausible. In the abstract, life with parole is significantly less harsh than
life without parole. Justice O'Connor does not, however, move beyond this
abstraction. She never explains how a sentence with parole eligibility after fifty
years is materially distinguishable from a life without parole sentence. Perhaps
they are distinguishable, but if so some explanation as to why is warranted. Her
specific response to the claim that Andrade's fifty year parole eligibility date
"makes this case similar to the facts" in Solem, is a complete non sequitor:
"Andrade's sentence, however, is also similar to the facts in Rummel... a case
that is also 'controlling. ' ' 216 Yes, similar, but quite different given the widely
disparate parole eligibility dates in Rummel and Andrade. Nonetheless, Justice
O'Connor explains, "[t]he facts here fall in between the facts in Rummel and
the facts in Solem." Of course, Nevada is somewhere in between California
and New York. None of this helps us understand why Solem and Andrade are
materially distinguishable from one another, except perhaps on a technicality.
I think, as lawyers, we must be aware of the possibility, and perhaps even
the likelihood, that under the second definition of "contrary-to," technical
differences will be treated as materially significant distinctions. We saw a
similar phenomenon in Ramdass v. Angelone, where the Court refused to
extend the rule of Simmons v. South Carolinato the functionally similar but
technically different facts in Ramdass. The Andrade Court did not announce

such a position, but one can infer a reluctance to recognize anything like
functional equivalence in both Ramdass and Andrade. On the other hand, both
decisions may simply reflect the majority's Teague-influenced reluctance to
215.
216.

Andrade, 123 S. Ct. at 1174.
Id. at 1174 n.1.
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extend a precedent beyond its fact-specific context. In the context of gross
disproportionality, this may mean that Solem, as a fact-specific precedent, is
limited to those cases in which the sentence is actually and technically a life
sentence without the possibility of parole. As such, this aspect of the Andrade
decision may speak more to proportionality than it does to the contrary-to
standard.
c. UnreasonableApplication
The Court's discussion of the unreasonable-application standard consists
of six relatively brief paragraphs. The first quotes the Williams definition of the
standard:
[U]nder the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle
to the facts of the prisoner's case, 17
It then references Williams for the proposition that the state court decision
must "be more than incorrect or erroneous.0 1 1 What Williams actually said,
however, was "an unreasonable application of federal law is differentfrom an
incorrect application of federal law., 2 19 I think the phrases are subtly different,
and by this observation I do not mean to suggest that the one phrase is "more
than" the other. My hunch is that the alteration of word choice was inadvertent,
for were it otherwise, the Ninth Circuit's clear-error standard would have been
more to the Court's liking. A clear error is "more than" a simple error. On the
other hand, an unreasonable application is not necessarily more than an error;
rather, it is different from an error, even though the two may coincide. In any
event, the Court ends this paragraph by returning to the actual question that
application of clearly established law must be
must be asked: "The state court's
22 0
objectively unreasonable.
In the next two paragraphs, the Court rejects the Ninth Circuit's clear error
standard. Under that standard, an application of clearly established federal law
is deemed unreasonable:
only when our independent review of the legal question "leaves us with a
'firm conviction' that one answer, the one rejected by the [state] court, was
217.

Id. at 1174 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
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Id.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added).
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correct and the other, the application of the federal law that the [state] court
adopted, was erroneous-in other words that clear error occurred. ' 22I
This standard has roots in both the abuse of discretion standard and in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard, both of which are
deferential standards that do not allow the reviewing court to substitute its
judgment for that of the initiating court. Under the former, a court would abuse
its discretion, that is, commit a clear error ofjudgment, if it failed to apply all
relevant factors in arriving at a particular conclusion. Under the latter, a
finding of fact is clearly erroneous if an appellate court "is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.0 2 On the other hand,
if a trial court's view of the evidence is plausible, that is, "[w]here there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot
be clearly erroneous. '223 It seems then that under a "clear error" standard, a
state court decision could not be reversed if the state court's application of the
clearly established federal law attended to all relevant factors and represented a
plausible choice. In other words, a mere disagreement with the state court
would not be enough. In fact, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that clear error
had been committed by the California Court of Appeal was based on that
court's "disregard for Solem," a case that the Ninth Circuit correctly perceived
to be a relevant and, at the very least, significant precedent. Hence, the
perceived unreasonable application derived from the state court's failure to
apply the full range of the Supreme Court's binding precedents.
The Court makes absolutely no effort to get beneath the skin of the Ninth
Circuit standard. Instead, the Court simply asserts that clear error and objective
unreasonableness "are not the same." While this is literally true, whether it is
true as a practical matter presents another question. There may well be a
congruence between the commission of a clear error and an objectively
unreasonable application of the law. We would not likely describe a state court
decision as objectively reasonable if the state court failed to apply the full
range of the relevant law or applied the law to the facts in a manner that we
could fairly describe as implausible. A judge that makes implausible choices is
not an objectively reasonable judge.
The Court's application of the unreasonable-application standard in
Williams supports this view. In that case, the Virginia Supreme Court "failed to
evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence" as required by
221. Andrade v. Attorney Gen. of Cal., 270 F.3d 743, 753 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Van
Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2000)).
222. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
223. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
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Supreme Court precedent. 224 In other words, the Virginia Supreme Court
ignored a key precedent pertaining to the prejudice prong of Strickland. This
default, according to the Williams Court, constituted an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.225 Justice O'Connor, who joined
the Court's opinion on this issue, agreed: "The Virginia Supreme Court's
decision reveals an obvious failure to consider the totality of the omitted
mitigation evidence. 2 26 If an "obvious failure" to apply the rule derived from a
particular precedent constitutes an unreasonable application of that precedent,
then it is difficult to understand why the Ninth Circuit's "clear error" standard
discovering a similar "obvious failure" was somehow deficient. Moreover, the
approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit is similar to, though apparently stricter
than, the approach adopted by Justice O'Connor in Penry II where the entire
focus of her jury instruction discussion was on the fact that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals had committed error (and not even clear error).
Instead of engaging the Ninth Circuit standard to determine if it was being
applied in a fashion consistent with Williams, that is, instead of asking whether
the California Court of Appeal's perception of the continuing legitimacy of
Solem represented an "obvious failure," the Court simply rejects the clear error
standard: "The gloss of clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts
by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness. 2 27 But what is
the proper scope of deference when the error represents an "obvious failure" or
reflects an implausible choice under the clearly established law? None, I
should think. In any event, the Court ends this discussion by reiterating its
view that the "application must be objectively unreasonable."' 228 The critical
issue then is what the Court means to include within this concept of objective
unreasonableness. Is the Court talking about applications of the law from the
perspective of a prudent, careful, and competent jurist, or is the standard
something entirely different?
The Court's "objectively unreasonable" test is ostensibly applied in the
next three paragraphs. In the first of these, the Court notes that state
legislatures have "broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the
scope of the proportionality principle-the 'precise contours' of which 'are
224. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000) (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738, 751-52 (1990)).
225. Id.
at 397.
226. Id. at 416 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Aside from the "obvious
failure," Justice O'Connor offers no further explanation as to why the Virginia Supreme Court's
application was unreasonable.
227. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S.Ct. 166, 1175 (2002).
228. Id.
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2 29 It then concludes, without any explanation, that "it was not
unclear.0'
objectively unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that
these 'contours' permitted an affirmance of Andrade's sentence."030 The next
paragraph cites two dissents from the denial of certiorari in separate threestrikes cases where the dissenting Justices argued that certiorari should have
been granted to clarify the scope of proportionality review in that context. The
apparent point of these citations is to reemphasize the lack of clarity in the law.
The final paragraph simply reiterates the Court's conclusion, namely, "it was
not an unreasonable application of our clearly established law for the California
Court of Appeal to affirm Andrade's sentence of two consecutive terms of 25
years to life in prison."23 ' As I finished reading this sentence, which appears at
the very bottom of the right-hand page in the Supreme Court Reporter, I turned
the leaf, fully expecting to see the Court's explanation for its conclusion. Iwas
stunned when I saw that the discussion had ended and all that remained was a
single sentence: "The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, accordingly is reversed. 3 2 In short, the Court never provides
any explanation as to what it means by the phrase "objectively unreasonable"
nor does it ever explain why the decision of the California Court of Appeal is
objectively reasonable, that is, not objectively unreasonable.
Let us put this in context. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the California
Court of Appeal's decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law. The key issue before the Supreme Court was whether
the Ninth Circuit's ruling was correct. One would think, then, that the Court's
opinion would fully attend to this issue and would bring to the table a sufficient
quantity and quality of analysis to shed light on this critical question. To do so
would require, at a minimum, an examination (not just a description) of the
standard applied by the Ninth Circuit, a reasoned explanation as to why that
standard was inadequate to satisfy objective unreasonableness, a description of
the content of the correct standard and an explanation, express or implicit, as to
how the correct standard differed in practical effect from the rejected standard,
and, perhaps most importantly-unless the Court were to remand the case for
these purposes-an application of the correct standard, including an
explanation as to how the state court decision did not transgress that standard.
None of these things occurred in the Court's discussion. None. At most the
discussion involves nothing more than an interlocking set of descriptions and
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Id.at 1175.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1176.
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conclusions. In the end, we do know, although we do not know why, that the
clear error test is not an acceptable measure of objective unreasonableness, but
we know little else. Given that habeas cannot issue unless there is error, if
neither simple error nor clear error will suffice, what else must be established in
order to conclude that a state-court decision was objectively unreasonable? Or,
as Justice O'Connor put it in Williams, what will qualify as an "obvious failure"
to apply the law correctly?
4. Rewinding Through the Court's Opinion
The problem with the Andrade opinion is not simply a lack of
craftsmanship, though its lack of craftsmanship is not inconsequential. Rather,
the deeper problem is one of potential incoherence. I can best explain that
point by working through the Andrade opinion in reverse order, beginning with
the unreasonable-application standard and ending with the clearly-establishedfederal-law principle. What we will see is that Andrade potentially dismantles
the text-based interpretation that the Williams Court so carefully constructed.
Ironically, Andrade and significant portions of Williams were formally authored
by the same Justice, though they were clearly not written by the same person or
with the same care. In the end, Andrade provides almost no sensible guidance
to lower federal courts who must apply what may now appear to be the
indeterminate standards of § 2254(d)(1).
I must make one preliminary point. Before a federal court can grant
habeas under either the contrary-to or unreasonable-application standards, that
court must establish that the state court decision was erroneous. That does not
mean that "error of law" is the standard of review. Quite clearly, it is not.
What it does mean, however, is that the presence of error is a necessary, albeit
not sufficient, condition for granting habeas. Hence, in determining that error
was committed by the California Court of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit did what it
had to do and precisely what the Supreme Court had done in both Williams and
PenryII. The Andrade Court's objection to this preliminary inquiry seems not
only misplaced and inconsistent with precedent but completely illogical.233
One cannot determine whether a particular application of the law is objectively
reasonable or unreasonable without at some point asking whether that
application reflects an error of law. I suppose it is possible to conjure up an
unreasonable but error-free application of the law, but I cannot imagine what
real-world relevance any such standard would have. Again, this does not mean
233. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2002) ("We disagree with this

approach.").
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that the unreasonable-application standard of review invites de novo review,
but only that the standard of review necessarily encompasses the concept of
error.
The measure of the unreasonable-application standard is one of objective
unreasonableness. This point was established in Williams and reaffirmed in
Andrade. Thus, a state-court decision cannot be reversed on habeas unless that
decision is objectively unreasonable, that is, unless that decision is not
objectively reasonable. 3 A decision need not be irrational to be characterized
as objectively unreasonable. In other words, objective reasonableness requires
something more than mere rationality. This was the holding of the Court in
Williams. In addition, while rationality is not a sufficient component of
objective reasonableness, it is a necessary one. To conclude otherwise would,
at the very least, run afoul of the arbitrariness standards of the Due Process
Clause. Moreover, from a textual perspective, an irrational application of the
law is almost by definition an unreasonable application of the law. Enter
Andrade.
The Andrade Court did not hold that the Ninth Circuit was wrong in
concluding that the California Court of Appeal had committed clear error.
Rather the Court held that the clear error standard was an inadequate measure
of objective unreasonableness. Thus, one could read Andrade as implicitly
instructing us that a state court decision is not objectively unreasonable even if
it is clearly erroneous. In other words, under this reading ofAndrade a clearly
erroneous decision can be an objectively reasonable one. Just stating the
principle sounds startling, but let us consider it further. A clear error in the
application of the law is one that reflects a failure to apply the full range of the
law's mandate or that arrives at an implausible choice in the application of that
mandate. The first type of error is objectively unreasonable under Williams.
Given that this was precisely the type of error identified by the Ninth Circuit in
Andrade, the rejection of the clear-error standard in Andrade is in considerable
tension with the decision in Williams. As to the "implausible choice" type of
error, it is true that an implausible choice is not necessarily an irrational choice.
Indeed, clear error can be established short of irrationality. But, as Williams
also establishes, so can objective unreasonableness. If implausibility is but one
step removed from irrationality, then Andrade and Williams have established a
conundrum under which objective unreasonableness can be established without
showing irrationality but cannot be established by demonstrating implausibility.
234. 1take the phrases "objectively unreasonable" and "objectively reasonable" to state
opposite propositions. Hence if a state court decision is not objectively reasonable, it is
objectively unreasonable. It cannot be both, and it must be one.
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If this means that there is a type of choice that falls somewhere between
irrationality and implausibility, that is, a choice that is more than implausible
yet not quite irrational, it remains to be discovered the word to describe that
very precise species of choice. It also suggests the possibility that the
unreasonable-application standard represents a null set within this realm.
Perhaps we are talking about an indisputable error, but the Williams Court
rejected this high bar when it rejected the Fourth Circuit's "reasonable jurists
would all agree" standard. So while it is established that a habeas petitioner
need not show that the error was irrational (Williams), it is not entirely clear
what the petitioner must show or even can show to satisfy the Court's standard
of objective unreasonableness. There is one exception. In Williams, the Court
found that the failure to apply clearly established federal precedent amounted to
an unreasonable application of the law. Despite the Andrade Court's "obvious
failure" to apply Williams, it is fair to assume that Williams remains good law
on this point, at least when the Court is willing to recognize the continuing
vitality of its own precedents. But note that this aspect of Williams is
essentially synonymous with the contrary-to standard. A failure to apply clearly
established precedent may be an unreasonable application of that precedent, but
it is also incompatible- with that precedent. Hence, after Andrade, the
unreasonable-application standard may be available only in a context in which
there is a congruency between it and the contrary-to standard. In all other
contexts, the unreasonable-application standard is freighted with a deep
incoherency that seems to create a null set of potential applications. Thus,
Justice O'Connor, who correctly insisted on an independent relevance for the
unreasonable-application standard in Williams, may have eviscerated that
independence in Andrade.
That brings us to the Andrade Court's treatment of the contrary-to
standard. The second component of that standard involved state-court
decisions on facts that are materially indistinguishable from binding Supreme
Court precedent but that arrive at a conclusion opposite to that precedent.
While the Court's application of this principle in Andrade is nothing more than
a thinly disguised conclusion devoid of any explanatory rationale, the ultimate
principle one derives from this aspect of the opinion is at least coherent. The
Court's refusal to consider functional similarities between apparently binding
precedent and the facts presented in a habeas petition suggests a desire,
consistent with the Teague jurisprudence, to cabin prior cases, particularly in
doctrinally controversial areas, to their specific facts. I do not think this is a
sensible approach to the law because it tends to exalt technical distinctions over
functionally equivalent facts, but it is at least coherent. It would be more
justifiable if the unreasonable-application standard retained some independent
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vitality because, at least on occasion, one might conclude that a binding
precedent was not sufficiently on all fours with the pending habeas case to
describe the state-court decision as materially indistinguishable and contrary to
that precedent, but that the cases were sufficiently close that an objectively
reasonable jurist would have adhered to the principles inherent in that
precedent.
The Andrade Court's treatment of the first component of the contrary-to
standard is more troubling. As I suggested earlier, this aspect of the Court's
opinion can perhaps be explained away as a failure to ask the right question,
but on the other hand it seems to sanction a state court's failure to consider and
apply the full range of clearly established federal precedent. It is one thing to
hold, as the Court did in Woodford v. Visciotti, that a federal court should not
read a state court opinion with ajaundiced eye. It is quite another to close both
eyes to a state court's "obvious failure" to recognize and apply the clearly
established federal standards. In this sense, the Court's opinion in Andrade
almost invites willful refusals to apply federal law. I say "almost," since this
inference can, one hopes, be limited to those cases in which the Court itself has
declared the applicable law to lack sufficient clarity to guide state courts to the
correct proposition of law.
And that brings us to the clearly-established principle of federal law. We
can now see why it was critically important for the Court in Andrade to avoid
any discussion of the law of gross disproportionality. By describing the legal
principle at an abstract level and by characterizing pertinent law as lacking in
clarity, the Court made it essentially impossible to conclude that the state
court's decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal
law. The lack of congruity between the Andrade description of the gross
disproportionality standards and the Ewing Court's description of those same
standards is almost stunning. By opting for abstraction, the demolition of the
§ 2254(d)(1) federal review standards occurs at both ends of the analysis. As
an opening gambit, the Court eschews its duty to describe the clearly
established principles that will guide its application of the federal review
standards, and as a closing move the Court compacts the unreasonableapplication standard into a rule that seems more like an abdication than it does
like a respectful deference for proper state-court judgments. In between, we
have a rather flaccid contrary-to standard, subject to what can be charitably
described as an almost whimsical application to be available as a standard of
review in only the most obvious situations.
It is possible to make too much out of the Andrade Court's construction
and application of § 2254(d)(1). The underlying substantive claim in Andrade
involved a proportionality challenge to the length of a sentence. Of the five
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Justices who joined the opinion for the Court, not a single one has ever voted to
enforce the proportionality principle in a case involving a term of incarceration.
And two of those Justices, Scalia and Thomas, have expressed their complete
opposition to the use of proportionality in such contexts. 235 Hence, the deck
was heavily stacked against affirmance of the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, one way
to view Andrade is as a case in which the majority's aversion to the
proportionality principle led it to a narrow, arguably unprincipled, and sui
generis application of § 2254(d)(1).
C. Wiggins v. Smith
At issue in Wiggins v. Smith,236 the fourth installment of this Term's
§ 2254(d)(1) tetrad, was whether a Maryland Court of Appeals decision
denying postconviction relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
during the penalty phase of a capital case involved an unreasonable application
of Strickland v. Washington.237 A Maryland federal district court, applying
§ 2254(d)(1), concluded that the state court's application of federal law was
unreasonable and granted habeas on that ground, but the Fourth Circuit
reversed, finding that the state court's decision was at least "minimally
consistent" with the Stricklandstandards. The Supreme Court, by a seven to
two margin, reversed the Fourth Circuit. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion
for the Court. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a dissent.
1. Facts,Proceedings,and Lower Court Opinions
After a trial before a Maryland state-court judge, Kevin Wiggins was
convicted of capital murder for drowning a 77-year-old woman in her bathtub.
He elected to have the determination of his sentence tried to a jury. His trial
counsel, both of whom were public defenders, filed a motion to bifurcate the
sentencing hearing into two phases. During the first phase, they planned to
retry their client's factual guilt, because under Maryland law the jury could not
sentence him to death unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a
principal in the first degree. During the second phase, if such a phase were
necessary, defense counsel planned to present a case in mitigation, which they
235. See Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1190 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that the state's legislative decisions should be given deference); id. at 1191 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (same).
236. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
237. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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assured the trial court they had prepared The trial court denied the motion to
bifurcate, and a "consolidated" sentencing hearing was immediately held.
At the sentencing hearing, the defense presentation focused almost
exclusively on the question of Wiggins's guilt. The only mitigating evidence
presented to the jury was the uncontested fact that Wiggins had no prior
convictions for violent crimes. After a brief deliberation, the jury sentenced
Wiggins to death. On appeal, the state court of appeals affirmed both the
conviction and sentence.238
With the aid of new counsel, Wiggins sought postconviction relief in a
Maryland state court. Among many other claims raised, he asserted that his
trial counsel had rendered "constitutionally defective assistance at the
sentencing proceeding by failing to investigate and offer mitigating evidence
concerning [his] traumatic background and mental problems."239 This claim
was supported by the testimony of a licensed social worker who, at the behest
of postconviction counsel, had prepared an elaborate social history report on
Wiggins's childhood, detailing "the severe physical and sexual abuse petitioner
suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster
parents. 2 40 Other evidence adduced during the postconviction proceedings
established that trial counsel had been aware of the generally bleak nature of
Wiggins's upbringing by virtue of a presentence investigation report by the
Division of Parole and Probation and from records of the Baltimore City
Department of Social Services. Nonetheless, trial counsel did not retain an
expert to investigate these matters further even though funds were available for
such an investigation. In defense of this choice, one of the trial counselors
testified that he did not want to adopt a "shotgun" approach at the sentencing
hearing, but wanted to focus the jury's attention on the innocence defense.24'
The trial court denied postconviction relief and the Maryland Court of
Appeals affirmed.2 42 Essentially, the appellate court ruled that the decision not
to investigate and not to present evidence of Wiggins's dysfunctional
upbringing was tactical and, hence, immune from a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In so ruling the court emphasized that counsel "were
aware that [Wiggins] had a most unfortunate childhood. 2 43 Specifically, they
had available to them "not only the pre-sentence investigation report prepared
238.
(1992).
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Wiggins v. State, 597 A.2d 1359, 1374 (Md. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1007
Wiggins v. State, 724 A.2d 1,4 (Md. 1999).
Id. at 16.
Id.at 15.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 15.
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by the Division of Parole and Probation, which included some of appellant's
social history, but also more detailed social service records that recorded
incidences of physical and sexual abuse, an alcoholic mother, placements in
foster care, and borderline retardation." 244 Thus, in the court's view, this was
not a case in which counsel completely failed to investigate a capital
defendant's background. Moreover, despite the absence of any detailed followup investigation, which the court recognized would have revealed a life "rife
with episodes of neglect and abuse," 45 the court accepted counsels' assertion
that they had made a tactical choice not to pursue this course of inquiry. In the
court's words:
Counsel made a reasoned choice to proceed with what they thought was
their best defense. They knew that there would be at least one mitigating
factor-the uncontested fact that appellant had not previously been
convicted of a violent crime-should the jury not credit their attack on
criminal agency. It was not unreasonable for them to choose not to distract
from their principal defense with evidence of appellant's unfortunate
childhood.2
Wiggins then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
district court for the District of Maryland. After a hearing on the petition, the
district court found that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance during
the sentencing phase based on their failure to investigate and present evidence
in mitigation. 47 In so ruling, the district court made it clear that its authority to
grant a writ of habeas corpus was circumscribed by § 2254(d)(1 ) as interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor.248 Applying the statutory
review standards, the district court concluded that the Maryland courts'
decisions rejecting the ineffective assistance claim "involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law,',249 namely, the law established in
Strickland v. Washington and subsequently applied in Williams.25 ° Moreover,
the district court concluded that the case before it was "almost directly

244. Id.
245. Id. at 16.
246. Id. at 17.
247. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538,577(D. Md. 2001). The district court also
found that the evidence of guilt was constitutionally insufficient to sustain Wiggins's
conviction. Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on this issue as well. Wiggins v.
Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 639 (4th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on
that question.

248.
249.
250.

Wiggins, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558 n.13.
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contrary" to Williams v. Taylor because "Wiggins's mitigation evidence was
much stronger, and the State's evidence favoring imposition of the death
penalty was far weaker, than the comparable evidence in Williams."25 ' In so
ruling, the district court specifically rejected the state's assertion that counsel's
decision not to pursue mitigating evidence was tactical:
That contention, which was accepted by the Maryland courts, is based upon
the testimony of trial counsel during the post-conviction hearing that they
made the decision to "retry guilt" before the sentencing jury and that they
did not want to dilute the effectiveness of their argument by presenting a
mitigation case as well. In fact, it appears that defense counsels' "tactical
decision" was forced upon them by inattention and lack of preparation.
Before the trial, lead counsel had taken a new full-time job in another
county, spent only "a day a week or so" attending to his former
responsibilities, and left it to his co-counsel to do "most of the work."
Here, the attorney left in charge had previously worked on only one or two
felony jury trials, had never before worked on a capital trial, and was
"frankly overwhelmed" as the trial date approached. Each of the defense
attorneys testified that the other was responsible for preparing the
mitigation case.
In any event, in order for a tactical decision to be reasonable, it must be
based upon information the attorney has made after conducting a
reasonable investigation. Wiggins's trial counsel conducted no such
investigation. It is true that when making their decision solely to "retry
guilt," counsel were aware of some mitigating information about Wiggins's
unfortunate upbringing. However, the very possession of that information
triggered their obligation to conduct a more complete investigation ....
Had they done so], they would have learned information that was far more
extensive and detailed than the information they possessed ....
The district court went on to hold that this more detailed information "might
253
well have influenced thejury's appraisal of... [Wiggins's] moral culpability."
Issuance of the writ was stayed pending appeal.
The Fourth Circuit reversed.254 The panel's opinion, authored by Judge
Emory Widener, citied the § 2254(d)(1) review standards and explained that as
to the unreasonable-application standard, federal habeas could not issue unless
"the state court's application of federal law was objectively unreasonable."' 5
Furthermore, the measure of objective unreasonableness was "whether the
251.

Id. at 557.

252. Id. at 558-59 (internal citations omitted).
253.
254.

Id. at 560 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000)).
Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2002).

255. Id. at 636.
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[state court's] determination is at least minimally consistent with the facts and
circumstances of the case., 256 This language suggested a resurrection of the
Fourth Circuit's "all reasonable jurists standard"-the standard expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor.257 Indeed, the Fourth
Circuit had previously used the "minimally consistent" language in explaining
the scope of its now-rejected standard. 58
On the merits of the habeas petition, the essence of the Fourth Circuit's
opinion was that the Maryland Court of Appeals was reasonable in concluding
that Wiggins's trial counsel made an informed, strategic decision not to present
a case in mitigation. 29 In so ruling, the Fourth Circuit made no independent
examination of whether counsel's choice reflected an objectively reasonable
exercise of professional judgment as required by Strickland. Rather, the court
sidestepped that question and, taking an uncritical approach to the facts,
accepted the "informed strategic decision" thesis as a plausible explanation for
counsel's decision not to pursue a case in mitigation. In this sense, one could
say that the "informed strategic decision" thesis was, in the Fourth Circuit's
view, at least "minimally consistent" with the facts and with Strickland's
requirement that counsel's performance not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. ° The Fourth Circuit did not discuss the prevailing
professional norms requirement as mandated by Strickland.26 '

2. The Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court reversed.26 2 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. The key question before the Court was whether the
Maryland Court of Appeals decision denying Wiggins post-conviction relief
256. Id. (quoting Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 159 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1998)).
257. See supra Part Ill.B. I (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion inWilliams v.Taylor).
258. Wright v.Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 156-57 (4th Cir. 1998).
259. Wiggins, 288 F.3d at 641.
260. Judge Niemeyer's concurring opinion expressed some doubt about the reasonableness
of the Maryland Court of Appeals decision, but Judge Niemeyer joined the panel majority on
the ground that "[t]here is support in the record" for the "informed strategic choice" thesis.
Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 644 (4th Cir. 2002). Why "support in the record" is
sufficient to establish objective reasonableness is not explained.
261. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) ("The proper measure of
attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.").
262. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2544 (2003).
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involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In
approaching this question, the Court briefly reiterated the principles informing
the inquiry, citing both Williams v. Taylor and Lockyer v. Andrade. The
bottom line remained unchanged: "The state court's application must have
been 'objectively unreasonable.' 2 63 Again, however, the Court suggested no
method for measuring objective unreasonableness.
The Court began its § 2254(d)(1) analysis by identifying the "clearlyestablished" federal law as that embodied in Strickland v. Washington's twopart test for measuring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 264 This
position is, of course, identical to the view adopted by the Court in Williams v.
Taylor, a case which also involved a capital defense lawyer's failure to
investigate and present evidence in mitigation during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. 265 This reiteration of the Williams holding makes it clear that
Andrade did not alter the approach to "clearly established" federal law endorsed
by a majority of the Court in Williams. Thus, post-Andrade (and postWiggins), clearly established federal law continues to include legal standards
that require a "case-by-case examination of the evidence."2 66 In other words,
underdeterminate laws may still be deemed clearly established for purposes of
habeas review.
Next, the Wiggins Court emphasized that in applying Strickland, Williams
had made "no new law. 2 67 Thus, even though Williams was decided after the
Maryland Court of Appeals decision, the decision in Williams was "illustrative"
as to how Stricklandmight be applied under similar circumstances.2 61 In this
sense, Williams created a baseline from which to measure the reasonableness of
the state court's application of Strickland,which is precisely what the federal
district court had done.
After identifying Strickland as creating the applicable and clearly
established principle of federal law, the Court segued into a discussion of the
merits of Wiggins's claim, namely, "whether the investigation supporting
counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins' [sic]
263. Id. at 2535.
264. Id. at 2535-36. The Strickland test requires that the defendant show that "counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness" and that "there is areasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
265. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000); see also supra text accompanying
notes 65-67 (discussing Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
266. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391.
267. Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. at 2535.
268. Id.
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background was itself reasonable.2 69 (Note the double layering of the
reasonableness inquiry in a habeas proceeding applying Strickland. Under
Strickland, counsel's performance must be objectively reasonable under
prevailing professional norms, while under § 2254(d)(1) a state court's
application of this component of Strickland must itself be objectively
reasonable.). In the Court's words, "In assessing counsel's performance, we
must conduct an objective review of their performance, measured for
'reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,' which includes a
context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen 'from
,,,270 In moving directly to the merits, the
counsel's perspective at the time ....
Court demonstrated the continuing importance of the inquiry into "error" when
applying the unreasonable-application standard. Ironically, the structure of the
closely tracks the approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Court's opinion
2 71
Andrade.
The Court gave three reasons for its conclusion that trial counsel's
investigation was not reasonable within the meaning of Strickland. First, the
failure to carry the investigation beyond the presentence report, which included
a one page summary of Wiggins's personal history, and the Department of
Social Services (DSS) records, which documented Wiggins's placement in
various foster homes, was inconsistent with well-defined professional norms.
Standard practice in Maryland called for the preparation of a social history
report, for which the Public Defender's Office made funds available; and
American Bar standards for the performance of counsel in death penalty cases
also called for a significantly more extensive investigation.272 In short,
counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing
the first element of Strickland's ineffective
professional norms, meeting
273
test.
counsel
of
assistance
Next, the Court found that the scope of counsel's "investigation was also
unreasonable, in light of what counsel actually discovered in the DSS
records., 274 Those records revealed that Wiggins's "mother was a chronic
alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed
some emotional difficulties while there; he had frequent, lengthy absences form
school; and, on at least one occasion, his mother left him and his siblings alone

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 2530.
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668-89 (1984)).
See supra Part IV.B.2 (describing the Ninth Circuit's opinion).
Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536-37 (2003).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2537.
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for days without food."27 5 In the Court's view, given this information, "any
reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads
was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses,
absence of any aggravating factors in
particularly given the apparent
276
petitioner's background.

Finally, the Court also found evidence of counsel's unreasonableness in
the record of the sentencing proceedings. In the Court's view, counsel's
performance at those proceedings suggested that "inattention, not strategic
judgment" explained the failure to investigate potential evidence in
mitigation. 77 In support of this contention, the Court stated:
On the eve of sentencing, counsel represented to the court that they were
prepared to come forward with mitigating evidence, and that they intended
to present such evidence in the event the court granted their motion to
bifurcate. In other words, prior to sentence, counsel never actually
abandoned the possibility that they would present a mitigation defense.
Until the court denied their motion, then, they had every reason to develop
the most powerful mitigation case possible.
Yet, clearly, given the absence of a thorough investigation, counsel was
not prepared to proceed with a case in mitigation. Moreover, the sentencing
defense actually presented was, in the Court's words, not a carefully
circumscribed innocence defense, as counsel asserted, but included "a
halfhearted mitigation case, taking precisely the type of 'shotgun' approach the
Maryland Court of Appeals concluded counsel sought to avoid. 279 Thus, in the
Court's view, counsel's strategic decision to limit the "pursuit of mitigating
evidence resembles more apost-hoc rationalization of counsel's conduct
than
2 80
an accurate description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.
Having concluded that counsel's performance fell below Strickland's
standard of professional competence, the next question was whether the
opposite conclusion of the Maryland Court of Appeals was objectively
unreasonable. Recall that the state court's rejection of Wiggins's Strickland
claim was premised on that court's determination that counsel had made what it
perceived as a reasonable, tactical decision not to present a case in mitigation.
The Supreme Court, having already held that counsel's decision was not
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2530.
Id. at 2537.
Id. at 2538.
Id.
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objectively reasonable within the meaning of Strickland,now concluded that
the state court's decision arriving at the opposite judgment was itself
objectively unreasonable because it was based on an assumption of the
adequacy of counsel's performance and not on an examination of whether that
28
performance was objectively reasonable under prevailing professional norms. '
By making this assumption, the state court overlooked the key question under
Strickland, namely, whether counsel's choice "to cease all investigation upon
obtaining the PSI and the DSS records actually demonstrated reasonable
professional judgment. 2 8 2 The Court also noted that the Maryland Court of
Appeals made a "clear factual error" when the latter court described the social
service records as having included references to incidences of sexual abuse.
Those records contained no such references. In the Court's words, "This partial
reliance on an erroneous factual finding further highlights the unreasonableness
83
of the state court's decision.0
The Wiggins Court's application of § 2254(d)(1)'s unreasonableapplication principle is found largely in a single paragraph that begins with the
conclusion: "The Maryland Court of Appeals' application of Strickland's
governing legal principles was objectively unreasonable."2 84 That paragraph
includes no explanation of how one is to measure whether a state court decision
is objectively unreasonable, that is, how one is to determine whether a
particular decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law. Yet this paragraph is nonetheless quite instructive. First, by
including a reiteration that counsel's failure to pursue a thorough investigation
of evidence in mitigation violated Strickland's first prong, the Court
underscores the essential role that error plays in the § 2254(d)(1) analysis.
While a perception that a state court has committed error may not end the
inquiry, it remains an essential part of that inquiry. Next, the paragraph
pinpoints the unreasonableness of the error committed by the Maryland Court
of Appeals as a product of that court's failure to ask the right question, namely,
whether counsel's choice to discontinue the investigation was consistent with
prevailing professional norms. In fact, the state court opinion is devoid of any
such discussion. The state court's conclusion that counsel's decision was
tactical, and hence immune from Strickland, never considers whether the
tactical choice, under the given facts, was objectively reasonable in light of then
extant standards of professional competence. Thus, the state court's purported
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 2538.
Id. at 2539.
Id. at 2538.
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application of Stricklandwas not only wrong in result, but unreasonable to the
extent that it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Stricklandtest. In
other words, the state court's decision did not merely reflect a disagreement
over potential outcomes under an underdeterminate principle of federal law, but
a failure by the state court to apply the precise principle at stake. That failure
can also be seen as reflecting the state court's misunderstanding of what that
principle actually entailed.
If the Court had not decided Andrade, Wiggins would be a completely
unremarkable decision. The version of the unreasonable-application principle
applied by the Wiggins Court is essentially identical to the version described
and applied in Williams v. Taylor. In Williams, which involved a similar
Strickland claim, the Virginia Supreme Court was found to have been
objectively unreasonable because it failed to consider the full range of matters
mandated by Strickland'ssecond prong, namely, the totality of the mitigating
evidence.2 8 Thus, although, the Virginia Supreme Court cited the correct legal
standard, its application of that standard reflected a significant misunderstanding
of it. This is quite similar to the error committed by the Maryland Court of
Appeals in Wiggins, namely, a purported application of the correct standard
that fails to account for the full measure of the standard. Of course, one could
say the same thing about the California state court's failure to apply the full
range of the gross disproportionality principle in Andrade, and herein lies the
tension between Williams and Wiggins, on the one hand, and Andrade, on the
other.
There is one other feature of the Wiggins decision worth noting. It
pertains to the degree of deference with which one is to read a state court
decision being challenged on habeas grounds. Recall that in Woodford v.
Viscotti the Court chastised the Ninth Circuit for its nondeferential and
selective reading of the California Supreme Court's decision. The Wiggins
opinion makes it clear that the deference required by § 2254(d)(1) is a
deference of sensible dimensions, not one of abdication. Specifically, one of
the collateral issues in Wiggins involved an interpretation of the Maryland
Court of Appeals opinion: Did the Maryland Court of Appeals assume that
trial counsel's investigation of Wiggins's life history was limited to the
presentence report and the social service records, or did that court's opinion
implicitly recognize that trial counsel had pursued an investigation that went
beyond those records? If the latter were true, then the Maryland court's
application of Strickland would be on more defensible grounds. The Wiggins
majority read the Maryland Court of Appeals decision as based on the former
285.

Supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
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assumption, while the dissent (and the State) argued for a broader reading of
the state court's opinion, namely, one premised on an assumption that counsel
did pursue a more thorough investigation of Wiggins's life history. The
majority explained its rejection of this more generous reading as follows:
The dissent bases its conclusion on the Maryland Court of Appeals
statements that "[c]ounsel were aware that appellant had a most unfortunate
childhood," and that "counsel did investigate and were aware of appellant's
background." But the state court's description of how counsel learned of
petitioner's childhood speaks for itself. The court explained: "Counsel
were aware that appellant had a most unfortunate childhood. [Wiggins's
counsel] had available to him not only the pre-sentence investigation
report... but also more detailed social service records." This construction
reflects the state court's understanding that the investigation consisted of
the two sources the court mentions. Indeed, when describing counsel's
investigation into petitioner's background, the court never so much as
implies that counsel uncovered any source other than the PSI and the DSS
records. The court's conclusion that counsel were aware of"incidences...
of sexual abuse" does not suggest otherwise because the court assumed that
counsel learned of such incidents from the social services records.
The [Maryland] court's subsequent statement that, "as noted, counsel did
investigate and were aware of appellant's background," underscores our
conclusion that the Maryland Court of Appeals assumed counsel's
investigation into Wiggins' [sic] childhood consisted of the PSI and the
DSS records. The court's use of the phrase "as noted," which the dissent
ignores, further confirms that counsel's investigation consisted of the
sources previously described, i.e., the PSI and the DSS records. 8 6
Thus, while a federal court must show respect for state court decisions
being challenged on habeas-the lesson learned from Woodford v. Viscotti-a
federal court need not engage in a strained reading of a state court opinion in
order to avoid a potential constitutional flaw in that decision. In other words, a
sensible reading is, almost by definition, a properly deferential reading.
V Return to the Text
To what extent did this quartet of habeas decisions add to our
understanding of § 2254(d)(1 )? In Part Ill.C, supra,I suggested that there were
at least three significant unresolved issues of statutory interpretation under
§ 2254(d)(1). Those issues pertain to the scope of the clearly established
principle, the scope of the "materially indistinguishable" component of the
286.
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contrary-to standard, and the content of the "objectively unreasonable" measure
of the unreasonable-application standard. I think it is fair to say that none of
the Court's 2002 Term decisions resolved or appreciably contributed to our
understanding of any of these open questions, and the decision in Andrade may
well have contributed some unnecessary confusion. However, there are some
valuable lessons to be learned from these cases, though perhaps not of a
distinctly doctrinal type. In addition, the Andrade opinion, in part because of
its shortcomings, invites us to revisit the text in a way that may illuminate both
how to read Andrade and how to proceed with the process of textual
interpretation post-Andrade.
The per curiam opinions break little new ground. While the Court in
Woodford v. Visciotti speaks to both the contrary-to and unreasonableapplication standards, that decision represents a more or less unremarkable
application of precedent. The same can be said of Early v. Packer. The
primary lesson to be gleaned from these cases pertains to the lens through
which a federal court ought to read a state-court decision. In a sense, both
cases do promote an overlay of deference to state-court decisions. That concept
of deference could arguably run the risk of diluting the actual words used in the
text of § 2254(d)(1), but the unanimous judgments issued by the Court in
Visciotti and Packerlargely conform to both text and precedent and present no
such threat. The deference demanded by these opinions can be fairly described
as a requirement that state court decisions be read with common sense and not
from a presumption of suspicion. In short, neither Visciotti nor Packer sheds
any significant new light on the most significant unresolved interpretive issues
pertaining to § 2254(d)(1).
Lockyer v. Andrade does, however, speak to each of these unresolved
issues. I will not repeat my criticisms of Andrade, but suffice it to say that
Andrade added more confusion than clarity to the mix of our understanding.
Some of that confusion is evident in the Andrade Court's approach to the
clearly established principle, some in its approach to the contrary-to standard,
and some in the palpable tension between the Court's earlier treatment of error
and objective unreasonableness in cases such as Williams v. Taylor and Penry
v. Johnson, and the Andrade Court's rejection of clear error as a measure of
objective unreasonableness. If the ascertainment of meaning continues to be
our goal, we must attend to these tensions, that is, we must continue the process
of statutory interpretation.
I do think that Wiggins v. Smith operates as a partial antidote to Andrade.
The Wiggins Court's approach to what constitutes clearly-established federal
law returns to the common-sense approach applied in Williams v. Taylor,
namely, the identification of the controlling principle by reference to pertinent
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holdings in Supreme Court precedents, and completely avoids the type of
sleight of hand obfuscation at work in Andrade. Additionally, the Wiggins
Court approached the question of unreasonable applications of federal law in a
fashion that paralleled the structure adopted by the discredited Ninth Circuit
opinion in Andrade, under which the reviewing court must identify the error
and then determine if the error was objectively unreasonable. Although, in the
process, the Wiggins opinion does not shed any new light on the content of
objective unreasonableness, at least the opinion reaffirms the principle applied
in Williams, and ignored in Andrade, that a state court that fails to apply the full
range of the applicable federal law standard will be deemed to have acted
unreasonably within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).
Beyond Wiggins, I have what may seem to be a counterintuitive
suggestion. In the usual way of thinking, when the Supreme Court interprets a
statutory (or constitutional) text we treat the Court's interpretation as the
equivalent of the text. Lower federal courts must do this. The interpretation
states the law of the text. In this sense, if there is a perceived conflict between
precedent and text, the precedent trumps the text. There is, however, another
way of looking at the relationship between text and interpretive precedent. If
the goal of textual interpretation is to discover all that a text fairly means, then a
habitual return to the text, despite the overlay of precedent, seems not only
appropriate but essential. The text is, after all, the gatekeeper of its own
meaning. I do not mean to suggest that the text trumps interpretive precedent.
At least lower courts are bound by that precedent. But an understanding of the
text unadulterated by precedent can shed light on the meaning we attribute to
the precedent.
I call this a "text-first" approach. By this I mean to describe (and endorse)
a process through which the text informs our understanding of the precedents
construing it, and not the reverse. Thus, the text-first interpreter must continually
inform her understanding of a statutory text by using that text as a primary
repository of meaning. Judicial precedent should be read as a product of that
primary repository. In short, she must allow her understanding of the text to
inform her understanding of the precedents. In this sense, the text limits the
precedent. We construe the precedent in a manner that conforms to rather than
confounds the text. Of course, if the precedent establishes a principle that is
plainly contrary to the text, the precedent may well trump the text. The law is
what the Supreme Court says it is. But the presumption should be that the
precedent is consistent with the text; hence, a text-first approach allows the text
to temper the precedent unless the presumption of textual primacy is plainly
rebutted. I will give three examples of how a text-first method might help us
understand the legitimate scope of the Andrade decision.
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In applying the first component of the contrary-to standard-a state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court
precedent-the Andrade Court did not consider whether the state court's failure
to apply Solem/Harmelin was contrary to clearly established federal law.287
Instead, the Court found it sufficient that the state court chose to apply Rummel
without reference to the complete body of applicable federal law. On a
presumption that precedent trumps text, one might argue that, after Andrade,
the contrary-to principle is not offended when a state court fails to apply the full
range of binding and applicable Supreme Court precedent. But such a view
essentially demolishes the text. A failure to apply the full-range of that
precedent is literally contrary to that precedent. A text-first argument would
posit that Andradecannot possibly stand for a principle so at odds with the text
unless the Andrade Court expressly so ruled, which it did not. At most,
Andrade represents an incomplete application of the doctrine of § 2254(d)(1 ).
The interpretive inferences we might draw from the Court's simple default
cannot, under a text-first approach, alter the meaning that emanates from the
text itself.
A text-first approach also helps clarify how we might understand the
Andrade Court's application of the clearly established principle. The statutory
text-"clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States"-imposes a rule of recognition that limits the scope of
federal habeas to those claims that are premised on legal principles embodied in
Supreme Court precedent. 288 As Williams makes clear, this statutory provision
requires the reviewing court to identify, by reference to holdings, as opposed to
dicta, the content and contours of that law. As I have already noted, the
Williams interpretation flows directly from a fair reading of the text. Andrade
purported to apply Williams, but instead relied on various statements by
individual Justices pertaining to the lack of clarity in the law of proportionality.
If we were to read Andrade as revising the "clearly established" inquiry into
one that permits lower federal courts the same type of latitude, we would
effectively alter, and perhaps even eviscerate, the text, for it is nigh impossible
for a state court decision to be contrary to or an unreasonable application of law
stated at its most abstract level.
But there is no legitimate reason to read Andrade in this fashion.
Andrade, as read from a text-first perspective, should be limited to those
contexts in which the Supreme Court itself has held that the law established by

287. Supra Part IV.B.3.b.
288. See supra Part I l.A (explaining the meaning of the phrase "clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States").
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the controlling precedents is discernible only at a highly generalized and
abstract level or in which the lack of clarity emanates directly from the Court's
holdings, as opposed to dicta. A lower federal court simply lacks the power
under § 2254(d)(1) to extract threads from concurring and dissenting opinions
as a method through which to so characterize the established law, that is, the
law that emanates from the holdings of Supreme Court precedent. After all, the
text of subsection (d)(1) instructs us that the law to be applied is the law "as
determined by the Supreme Court." 289 In this sense, Andrade is an example of
a case in which the Supreme Court exercised an exceptional power that simply
does not reside in lower federal courts. At most, Andrade stands as a warning
that the Supreme Court might, in some future case, conclude on review of a
lower federal court judgment that the legal doctrine is properly characterized at
an abstract level. A text-first approach, however, focuses attention on Supreme
Court precedent and precludes lower federal courts from engaging in what is in
essence a law-creating function. Hence, consistent with text and Andrade, the
responsibility of a lower federal court remains to identify the law at its
pragmatic level of application, and not at its most abstract level of
contemplation. The Wiggins Court's return to the Williams Court's more
prosaic approach to the clearly established principle is consistent with this
precise reading of Andrade.
Perhaps the most important use of the text-first approach apropos of
Andrade comes in the context of the unreasonable-application standard. In this
context, lower federal courts simply must do what the Supreme Court has not
done. They must, on a case-by-case basis, construct a model of objective
reasonableness in order to give meaningful content to the phrase "unreasonable
application." I suggest that the place to begin this process is with the objective
reasonable jurist standard, that is, the prudent, careful, and competent judge
who is always up to the standard. Under this approach an application of the
law is "unreasonable" if it is of the sort that an objectively reasonable jurist
would not perform. Such a measure is both consistent with the text of
§ 2254(d)(1), that is, with the mandated search for unreasonable applications,
and with the Supreme Court's own articulated but yet to be fully explained
"objectively unreasonable" standard. We can only know what is objectively
unreasonable if we know what an objectively reasonable jurist might have
done.
This process of creating the law of the objectively reasonable jurist need
not start at square one. The Court has provided some clues as to the expected
289. See Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 664 (2002) (defining "determined" and "held" as
synonymous for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)).

HABEAS STANDARDS OF RE VIE W
behavior of an objectively reasonable jurist. She would apply the full range of
the clearly established principles of federal law (Williams), and she would not
validate applications of that law that are "ineffective or illogical" (Penry I1).
We could reasonably conclude as well that her applications of the law would
not display a material misunderstanding of the legal principles at stake. Nor
would our objectively reasonable jurist fail to attend to all facts relevant under
the terms of the applicable doctrine. Recall that the reversal of the Ninth
Circuit in both Visciotti and Packer was premised on the Supreme Court's
judgment that the respective state courts in both cases had attended to the full
range of the relevant doctrine and facts. We know too that our objectively
reasonable jurist would make only rational choices among legitimately
competing alternatives, though we know also that mere rationality is not itself
sufficient to validate a judgment as objectively reasonable. We also know that
an objectively reasonable jurist may legitimately refuse to apply an otherwise
binding precedent if she concludes that the precedent is materially
distinguishable from the case pending before her (PenryI).
That brings us to the clear-error standard. Given Andrade, will our jurist
be deemed objectively unreasonable if she makes an implausible choice under
clearly established federal law? Andrade seems to say "no" because it rejected
the clear-error standard, but before arriving at that conclusion we might want to
consider more closely the context of the Andrade Court's rejection of that
principle. While the Ninth Circuit opinion in Andrade represents a credible
example of judicial craftsmanship with respect to the law of gross
disproportionality, it also includes a large analytical gap when it comes to the
relationship between clear error and the unreasonable-application standard.
Absent from the Ninth Circuit's opinion is an explanation as to how a finding
of clear error equates with objective unreasonableness; nor was there any
explanation as to why the error committed by the California Court of Appeal
was "clear." Hence, there was nothing in the Ninth Circuit's opinion to give
the majority of the Supreme Court any confidence that clear error and objective
unreasonableness represented congruent concepts. Nor is any such link
established in Van Tran v. Lindsey,290 the Ninth Circuit's foundational case on
this issue. This assumed connectivity between error and unreasonableness flies
in the face of the Williams Court's pronouncement that the words
"unreasonable" and "incorrect" do not signify the same thing. So too, the
phrases "objectively unreasonable" and "clearly erroneous" do not signify the
same thing. In essence, the Ninth Circuit failed to meet its burden in
establishing the logical connection between clear error and objective
290.
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unreasonableness. In addition, having failed to explain (other than through
inference) why the error committed by the California Court of Appeal was
"clear," the Supreme Court had nothing to go on but the Ninth Circuit's
descriptive standard of review. Moreover, this was a standard that appeared to
displace completely the statutory "unreasonable application" standard.
This flaw in the Ninth Circuit's opinion makes me think that the Supreme
Court's rejection of the "clear error" rule may not be as bright-line as it seems.
Let us consider a spectrum of judicially-perceived errors: potential error,
possible error, probable error, clear error, and indisputable error. If we
accept, as we must given Williams, Penry II, and Wiggins, that objective
unreasonableness requires some type of error and that indisputable error creates
too high a bar, then clear error would seem to be the window through which we
can most likely view objective unreasonableness. I have already suggested that
there is a strong congruence between clear error and objective unreasonableness
and that failing to see that congruence may render the unreasonable-application
standard superfluous.2 9 ' But given Andrade, it will not be enough to say or
even insist that clear error equals objective unreasonableness. Instead, the
proponent of establishing objective unreasonableness, be that person a lawyer
or a judge, must demonstrate that in the particular case under review, the
window of clear error fully illuminates the objectively unreasonable character
of the state court decision being challenged. The most effective way to do this
will be to explain why a prudent, careful, and competent jurist would not have
made such an error. In other words, it will not be enough to describe the error
as "clear." Rather, the implausibility of the choice must be established in terms
that speak to the choices that would be made by an objectively reasonable
jurist. Clear error is not a conclusion, but a means of explanation.
Adopting a text-first interpretation of Andrade, we would not prefer a
construction of that opinion that rendered the unreasonable application
superfluous. Hence, we should seek an interpretation of Andradethat respects
both the opinion and the text it construes. The Andrade Court's rejection of
"clear error" as a standard for measuring objective unreasonableness, therefore,
should be seen as confined to the uses of clear error as a conclusion rather than
as an explanatory tool. Thus, under Andrade, clear error is not "the" measure
of objective unreasonableness, but it does, from a text-first perspective, remain
available as a device through which to explain why a particular application of
the law is unreasonable, lest we too readily presume that implausible choices
reflect sound judicial practice. In short, after Andrade, an implausible choice,
that is, a clearly erroneous choice, can be demonstrated to be an objectively
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unreasonable choice. It will simply not be enough to label that choice as clear
error. In other words, clear error after Andrade is an analytical tool, not a
dispositive conclusion.
At the conclusion of my textual analysis of the unreasonable-application
standard, I observed that an unreasonable application might occur if the judge
fails to give appropriate weight to a legally relevant factor, gives significant
weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, renders a decision that is
implausible, arbitrary, irrational, or that reflects a misunderstanding of the
controlling legal principles, or, more generally, renders a decision that is plainly
at odds with the applicable law or with accepted standards of judicial
practice.2 92 I adhere to this statement post-Andrade. The flaws within the
Andrade opinion should not be construed so as to alter the readily ascertainable
meaning of the text of§ 2254(d)(1). In short, a text-first approach to Andrade
shows respect for both the text of subsection (d)(1) and the legitimate essence
of the Andrade opinion.
VI. Conclusion
I began this Article with the observation that textual interpretation is not
an event but a process. The Supreme Court's most recent decisions on
§ 2254(d)(1) are part of that process. Whether one agrees with those opinions
in whole or in part is not the critical point. The critical point is to understand
those decisions and to reflect upon the next step in the interpretive process.
While the Andrade opinion may not represent a wholly positive step in this
process-and it does not, in my estimation-it also does not end that process.
Indeed, if the net result of Andrade is that lawyers and lower federal courts give
more precise attention to the text of § 2254(d)(1) and, perhaps most
importantly, to the proper measure of the "unreasonable application" standard,
then Andrade has accomplished a good thing. The key is to keep the text in
mind and to develop principles of application that respect the text and do not
float into a nether world of generalized deference and abdication.
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